Sovereignty as Responsibility:
Rethinking International Law and Security
By Jan Kozak, May 2003, Macalester
College, Saint Paul, MN, United States
Introduction
How can the US
government most effectively address the threat of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) to foster both domestic and international security?
Can the United States
(US) survive in safety at home without imperial policing abroad?
What are the US interests and objectives? What are
the threats to those interests and objectives? What are the appropriate
strategic responses to those threats? What principles should guide the
development of US foreign policy and security strategy?
“Sovereignty as Responsibility: Rethinking
International Law and Security” examines the role of the US in promoting a
more stable, secure and prosperous world. The focus of this essay is on the
relevance of the international legal system and its efficacy to respond to new
threats to security and subsequently on the implications that such an analysis
has for framing US foreign policy. The maintenance of global peace, stability
and prosperity is in the interest of both the US and the world at large.
Although the United Nations (UN) has certainly had great accomplishments in
peacekeeping and peace building efforts, it represents an inadequate tool to
deal with security threats originating from non-state actors such as terrorist
groups and from the so-called rogue states, which defy the very foundations of
international governance and consistently fail to abide by key international
regulations pertaining to fundamental security issues. The UN has been
designed in the aftermath of World War II to prevent inter-state conflicts.
The changing nature of the international security environment however raises
questions about the relevance and adequacy of this institution. In today’s
world, the state will need to remain the fundamental building block of the
international system of global governance. Ultimately, it is the state, which
is accountable first and foremost to its citizens. As such, it will need to
place issues pertaining to national security and national interests on top of
its priorities even if this may mean disrespecting international law. In this
new era, the role of the military will remain strong (to deter war, project
power, and fight in defense of national interests if deterrence fails).
Policies promoting economic growth and political openness will aim to further
liberalize international trade and stabilize international monetary system.
Coalitions with allies will need to be strengthened to share the burden of
promoting peace, prosperity and freedom, and comprehensive relationships
between major powers such as the US, Russia and China will prove vital to
shaping the international political system. At last, US foreign policy will
need to assume a responsibility to deal decisively with the threats posed by
rogue states and terrorist groups.
I first examine the effects of the terrorist attacks
in the United States on September 11, 2001 on US foreign policy. Subsequently,
I analyze the evolution of the international legal system and its
incompatibility with the principal goal of individual states – the protection
of its citizens. At last, I address the issue of the changing nature of
threats to security and examine the kinds of responses to these threats drawn
by both policy-makers and academics.
The 9/11 Effect:
From Unipolar to Uncertain Moment
“The world will never be the same again”, claimed
many media-reporters, policy makers, analysts and academics alike immediately
after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001.
Indeed, America has never seen anything of such a scale and impact happen on
its own territory. Seeing images of the Twin Towers in New York City crumble
resembled fiction or events previously associated with distant unknown parts
of the world. America’s territorial integrity was violated. Feelings of fear
and insecurity seemed to have been instilled in people’s minds almost
instantaneously. Should we therefore understand 9/11 as a turning point in the
history of human civilization or should we see it as an event illustrative of
the world, which we have created for ourselves and in which we live today?
Perhaps, we should focus our attention on the root causes of terrorism, which
had led to 9/11 in the first place. An undue emphasis on the tragic events of
9/11 may divert our attention from some more important problems and underlying
issues that may need to be addressed in order to prevent history from
repeating itself.
Whether or not 9/11 will indeed turn out to be a
historical milestone will depend on history itself. What can be said with
greater certainty however is the following: US interests and foreign policy
have always been framed around a major security threat, be it Nazism and
fascism during World War II or communism and the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. As the Berlin Wall was disassembled and the Soviet Union disintegrated,
the US has found itself in a world with no threat to contain or no power to
deter. Or, at least, that was the general perception. Steve Smith has referred
to this period as the unipolar moment marked by an increased activity on the
part of US policy makers and academics to essentially determine what kind of
world order should emerge, and what role and strategies should the US adopt.
The lack of a major threat rendered the US foreign policy framework useless
and inapplicable. As a result, conservative forces in Washington DC have
struggled to identify such threats. Mary Kaldor argues that old-style warfare
will not and cannot properly respond to 9/11. The complex political world of
fragmented authority (as opposed to consolidated sovereign states) and
wrenching inequality demands a new way of fighting – one that mobilizes
people’s minds and hearts behind the aspiration to global justice.
In this context, 9/11 should be seen as
a moment in US history reinforcing the tradition of defining US interests and
foreign policy in opposition to a major threat, rather than in terms of global
interests, but also as a moment, which enabled the US political elites to
explicitly reaffirm the values for which they stood and which they were ready
to fight for: free markets, human rights and democracy.
The War on Terrorism declared by President George
W. Bush provides a framework through which to legitimate US foreign policy.
Terrorism and terrorist networks do not fit the existing framework of the 20th
century conflicts. Although terrorist networks may be sponsored by states,
which provide financial assistance, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or
share intelligence, they are not necessarily state-based and can operate
transnationally. Given the difficulties and limitations of framing one’s
foreign policy around an uneasily identifiable opponent, the US rhetoric aims
at creating legitimate grounds for counter-terrorist measures and policies by
assigning political motives to terrorism and linking those to established
actors (states) in the international arena. As a result, the US has been
criticized for disregarding international law when it did not suit its
interests, and for selfishly pursuing its own interests without paying too
much attention to anyone else’s. Undeniably, the US is the world’s economic
and military superpower. Such a hegemonic position indeed attracts the
attention of many and becomes subject of envy and hatred. Numerous accounts of
empire-building efforts have been advanced to illustrate and explain the
current approach of the US administration to framing and conducting its
foreign policy. I argue however, that this kind of a criticism is not
necessarily a constructive approach to the ever-evolving debates about the
nature of contemporary threats to security.
Although the acknowledgement of the nature of the
terrorist threat, as delineated above, appears to require stronger
international institutions, cooperation, and a truly multilateral approach to
resolving political and economic conflicts, as well as addressing the root
causes of terrorism, it is clear that the international community and states
with a seat at the UN Security Council in particular have not yet been able to
come to a consensus on how to tackle these threats effectively. Meanwhile,
security issues will remain in the hands of individual nation-states as the
ultimate agents responsible towards their citizens for the provision of such
measures so as to reduce threats to the maximum extent possible. If indeed the
Bush administration sees preventive self-defense (pre-emptive strikes) as the
only solution left, having tried all other options, then it is entirely
justified to do so.
The Sovereign Equality of States vs.
Sovereignty as Responsibility
The foundational doctrine of international law – the sovereign equality of
states – assures the states the prerogatives of territorial integrity and
political independence. This doctrine is upheld by the principle of
non-intervention on matters of domestic jurisdiction. Since the founding of
the UN, it was assumed that good domestic governance and upholding of friendly
inter-state relations would ensure the maintenance of international peace and
security. Yet, the record of human rights abuses is growing, rule of law is
weak or non-existent in many parts of the world, and illegitimate and
unaccountable governments together with ruthless dictators continue to
contribute to growing poverty and feelings of fear and insecurity everywhere.
The threats that terrorism presents to people everywhere only add to the
already unsatisfactory state of affairs in the world today. It is obvious that
many states lack the capacity, and often the willingness, to take appropriate
steps to deal with this situation. Equally so, it has become clear that the UN
has neither the capacity nor possibility to act effectively.
The key problem preventing the UN from acting effectively is the current
understanding of the concept of sovereign equality of states. I argue that
there are limits to sovereignty. States have the responsibility first and
foremost towards their citizens, but also towards the international community.
A state’s legal and moral right to claim protection of the norm of
non-intervention is dependent upon it satisfying a certain minimum or basic
standards of humanity. A failure of a state to act responsibly at home or
internationally must imply a permanent or temporary loss of its sovereignty.
As sovereign states remain the only actors through which the international
community seeks to implement security and stability, the challenge for the
liberally minded international community today is to close the gap between the
commitments to and the actual practice of international law through public
condemnation of international law violations, promises of rewards for good
behavior, threats of economic sanctions, and ultimately armed intervention, if
necessary. The society of liberally minded states has the potential to use
international law as a civilizing force against repressive regimes. This
indeed requires a radical revision of international law especially in regards
to the procedures authorizing the use of force against states posing an
imminent threat to international peace and stability. Assuming the UN Security
Council will not act on this matter, the responsibility essentially lies in
the hands of the willing and capable.
I
argue that the presence of a global hegemon such as the US has potential
positive side effects. The US is the only superpower in the post-Cold War era.
As such, it is also the only power, which possesses the capacity to enforce
international law. Furthermore, the world today does not confront threats only
from state actors, but also from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. It
is in the interest of the US to define its foreign policy objectives in terms
of global interests, and subsequently pursue these through exemplary
leadership. This implies the need for the US to actively and consistently
promote democratic ideals, human rights and the rule of law everywhere. Others
have referred to this kind of an engagement as the US empire building. No
matter how we call things, it is quite clear that the US foreign policy
objectives of promoting free markets, human rights and democracy in most
instances represent an appealing alternative to inefficient state-run
economies and authoritarian regimes that violate even the most basic human
rights on a daily basis. There is substantial historical evidence that
totalitarian regimes ignoring international law pose the greatest threat to
both the US and global security. As Michael Ignatieff stated it however,
“Multilateral solutions to the world’s problems are all very well, but they
have no teeth unless America bares its fangs.”
Unless the UN Security Council decision-making rules are reformed to integrate
the notion of “sovereignty as responsibility” to more adequately respond to
terrorism and associated threats, the US will assume the obligation to police
the world and enforce international law through any means available including
military force particularly in cases where such violations are deemed to
present imminent threats to both US and global security. As President George
W. Bush pointed out in his June 1, 2002 speech at West Point,
New threats also require new thinking. Deterrence
– the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against
shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment
is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can
deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist
allies.
On December 11, 2002, President George W. Bush issued the National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction establishing “a comprehensive approach to
counter the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction.”
According to this strategy, WMD - nuclear, biological, and chemical - in the
possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest
security challenges facing the United States. One of the central tenets of the
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is the effort to
broaden the concept of “imminent attack” to account for the potential threats
posed by terrorist groups willing and capable to use WMD without warning and
in secret. Thus, the US government insists it has an obligation to pursue a
comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions both at
home and internationally.
The proliferation of WMD is widely recognized as the most serious threat to
the national security of the US and other nations. At the beginning of 2002
there seems to be a balanced appreciation of the urgency of new efforts to
prevent proliferation, deter use, and if necessary, respond to the
consequences of attacks involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
WMD have been made increasingly subject to regulation at the global level, and
codified into a broad array of bilateral and multilateral treaties. The
so-called rogue states continue to disdain such regulations, but the
likelihood that they would deploy WMD against the US is minimal due to its
military superiority. Rogue states aim to acquire or produce WMD in order to
assert and retain their regional hegemony, status and control over natural
resources, namely oil. Following the events of September 11, 2001, however, it
becomes clear that WMD could pose a much more serious threat to US and
international security if in possession of terrorist groups.
The Future Roles of the US and the UN
The US might have to strike first before the danger posed by terrorist
networks and rogue states acquiring WMD materialize. This understanding is
embodied in the idea of “pre-emptive strikes” – an action by a state or group
of states to respond to a threat of imminent attack. The US will need to
persuade the international community of the need to broaden the right of
self-defense to include preventive self-defense. Ultimately, the success or
failure of this effort to reform international law to promote peace and
security and to reduce threats posed by terrorism will depend on the extent to
which the new understanding of “sovereignty as responsibility” will be
accepted by the international community.
Indeed, this is a discourse radically diverging from the one that dominated
international relations before 9/11 though one could interpret the language of
the first Bush administration in 1992 as implying the need for such reforms.
It necessarily implies the weakening of the concept of national sovereignty
and territorial integrity under international law. It also implies that the US
may find itself fighting many more illegal wars (according to international
law), as was the case in Kosovo or most recently in Iraq. Ultimately, however,
whether legal or illegal, the international community will judge the US not
according to the legality of its actions, but according to their legitimacy.
If, in the end, the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
turns out to be successful at installing democratic governments in places
previously governed by ruthless dictators, if human rights are respected, and
gains from economic development widely shared among the population at large,
the US-led War on Terrorism will set an important precedent placing concerns
for human rights, peace, stability and security above the principles of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
What is perhaps slightly disturbing about the recent developments in framing
US foreign policy is the potential destabilizing effect it may have on the
established international order. If the US indeed gets its way and succeeds in
bypassing the UN every time it chooses so, how should the international
community respond to similar claims advanced by other states? The potential
for new conflicts to emerge may dramatically increase if other states
interpret the current US foreign policy as a signal providing a precedent for
the use of military force framed as “preventive self-defense”. The invocation
of such right in unstable regions such as the Middle East or South Asia,
namely India and Pakistan, could have dangerous implications for regional
stability and increase the prospects for deployment of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons. The US clearly needs to address the
concern that others may wish to invoke the right to preventive action. The UN
may provide a suitable arena to resolve such disputes. Although the US seems
to be demanding that the right for “preventive self-defense” be restricted
only to the US, it is quite unlikely that the international community and the
UN Security Council in particular would in fact respond positively to such
demands. It is for this reason that maintenance of good relations between the
US and the UN will be key to preventing such negative side effects from
occurring.
In the end, it will depend on the UN to determine the appropriateness and
relevance of this worldview and subsequently reform itself to better serve the
needs of global peace and security, or, accept that its role will be confined
to peace-keeping, peace-building and some humanitarian interventions, or, to
ultimately render itself useless and irrelevant at least in regards to
achieving its main mission: promote a more secure, stable and peaceful world.
Numerous visions of an appropriate and adequate US foreign policy in the
post-Cold War and post-9/11 contexts present themselves for consideration. In
order to develop my central thesis of “sovereignty as responsibility”, I first
focus on the evolution of international law and how this process shaped,
defined and effectively codified the principle of national sovereignty as
bearing a nearly absolute primacy in international relations. Subsequently, I
examine several competing theoretical perspectives and visions of US foreign
policy strategies in order to determine which perspective provides the most
appropriate framework through which to determine the most effective measures
to reduce terrorist threats and the possibility of use of WMD against the US,
its friends and allies.
On the Way to Peace and Stability?
The Caroline Case of 1837
International law is rather ambiguous on the subject of authorization of
military action. For a start, it may be useful to consider the Caroline case
of 1837, which set an important precedent in customary international law.
In 1837, the British were crushing a rebellion in
Upper Canada. The United States, while unwilling to antagonize a superpower by
supporting the rebels directly, failed to prevent a private militia being
formed. The volunteers used a steamboat, the Caroline, to transport
arms and men to an island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River. The
British responded with a night raid: capturing the vessel as it was docked at
Fort Schlosser, New York, they set it on fire and sent it over Niagara Falls.
Diplomatic representatives of both parties eventually agreed, “Such raids
could be justified only if there was a 'necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation' - and
if nothing 'unreasonable or excessive' was done.”
Although this case has never been integrated into jurisprudence, it provides
evidence for the simple fact that “preventive self-defense” is not a new thing
under the sun.
From the Council of the League of Nations
to the UN Security Council
Real constraints on military aggression in international law were not imposed
until 1919, when the Council of the League of Nations was authorized to issue
recommendations to states in danger of going to war. If the Council failed to
agree, however, the disputing parties were free to take whatever action they
considered “necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.”
Following the end of World War II, the international community showed great
eagerness and expressed strong feelings about the need to establish an
international mechanism, which would prevent future conflicts and work towards
ensuring global peace and stability. In 1945, representatives of 50 countries
met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. The principles of national
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention were for the first
time introduced into international law. Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter (Action with Respects to the Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Pace, and Acts of Aggression) authorizes the UN Security Council to “take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”
The UN Charter provides a clear definition of under what circumstances
military action can be authorized: in the absence of an attack, the UN
Security Council alone can act.
Cold War and the Weapons of Mass
Destruction
With respect to WMD, indeed, if sufficient evidence of an imminent biological,
chemical or nuclear attack were available, there would be no doubt that the UN
Security Council would take action. The potential destructive power of WMD can
hardly be confined.
Cooperative efforts to regulate warfare have enjoyed a mixed record of success
since the end of World War II. The international community initially focused
on disarmament, as weapons themselves were thought to contribute to the causes
of war. However, with the growing disagreements between the two superpowers,
indicating the beginning of the Cold War, the idea of total disarmament was
soon abandoned. Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union chose to enter
negotiations on a variety of arms control measures. Global arsenals of WMD
reached their highest levels during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s when
thousands of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons were perfected and
produced on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
With the US/Soviet leadership, states sought to regulate the number,
deployment and employment of certain weapons through arms control—as distinct
from disarmament—agreements.
This approach did not require reduction in armaments; instead it aimed to
establish transparency within a controlled framework designed to achieve
stability and predictability in an adversary relationship. However, even
before the end of the 1980s, both the US as well as the Soviet Union agreed to
reduce their arsenals, while jointly recognizing the potential threats that
such weapons could pose to both superpowers if propagated to other nations.
International stability during the Cold War was founded upon a division of the
world based on mutually assured destruction. Beginning in early 1960s, the
US/Soviet conflict gave rise to a series of arms control agreements that
regulated in considerable detail the superpowers’ respective nuclear arsenals:
restrictions on weapons testing; prohibitions related to nuclear proliferation
and to various deployment modes; and limits on the numbers and types of
strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive.
The Cold War arms control process was essentially bilateral, with each side
viewing it as a way to manage the bilateral relationship. To be sure, several
arms control regimes from the Cold War were multilateral. Aside of the Cold
War arms control arrangements between the US and the Soviet Union, not much of
other political and diplomatic action was taken at the UN to regulate
international relations. The global order was essentially determined and
maintained by the two superpowers aiming to maintain an effective balance of
power, thus deterring each other from deploying military force to disrupt this
equilibrium. The UN Security Council never invoked Article 42 during the
entire Cold War despite the urgency of the many conflicts throughout the
post-World War II era. The UN Security Council’s move to any such resolution
was impossible as either of the two superpowers could use their veto powers to
prevent any such action. For the first time, Article 42 of the UN Charter was
invoked in 1990 in response to Iraq’s war of aggression against and illegal
occupation of Kuwait. Article 51 of the UN Charter requires that an “armed
attack” take place before the right of self-defense can be invoked. However,
the UN Security Council has also repeatedly authorized military action even in
cases where there was no threat to its members – i.e. Iraq, Somalia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti.
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the
post-Cold War Era
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the atmosphere at the UN was
characterized by excessive optimism, while conflicts in the Third World began
to resurface. It was in this light that the international community began
paying greater attention to the destabilizing forces in the Third World.
Already in a 1992 statement made by the UN Security Council, it was declared,
The proliferation of
all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace
and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to
prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of
such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.
President Bush, in his remarks to the UN Security Council on January 31, 1992,
declared democracy, human rights and the rule of law to be the building blocks
of peace and freedom. The US as a global hegemon, unmatched in neither
military nor economic power, however had given to itself the privilege of
enforcing this order when it suited its interests, while demanding exemptions
from other rules. This is perhaps best illustrated by the vehemence of US
rhetoric when it comes to international trade liberalization negotiations or
rule-setting pertaining to WMD and by the blatant rejection of other
international efforts on issues such as climate change or international
justice. Ironically, in the same speech, Bush (Sr.) recognized the limitations
that the Cold War imposed on the UN capacity to take appropriate action to
defend and promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. He called for
an internal reform of the United Nations Security Council to better deal with
“the proliferation of mass destruction, regional conflicts, destabilizing
renegade regimes that are on the horizon, terrorism, and human rights
violations.”
At least rhetorically, the US was prepared to cooperate with allies to ensure
that dangerous materials and technology do not fall into the hands of
terrorists or others.
The Third World Threat in the post-Cold War
Era
As a result of the withdrawal from the Third World of the two major
superpowers following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the Third World has been increasingly seen as unimportant to the
United States. Internal conflicts and the lack of sophisticated weaponry were
thought to be factors, which would not have the potential to threaten global
peace and security. However, there is a growing likelihood that the Third
World states will act in ways inimical to American interests due to the
persistence of instability often leading to war combined with the increasing
capability of many Third World states to threaten American interests,
particularly in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and supply of oil.
These make the Third World of continuing concern to the United States in the
post-Cold War era. Additionally, the emergence of radical anti-American
movements and terrorist groups with explicit anti-American agendas in many
Third World countries poses yet another problem and a reason for the need for
the US to remain involved in the Third World in order to prevent the spread of
WMD. The US faces much less stable and reliable opponents today than during
the Cold War—rogue states like North Korea and Iran with potential to supply
WMD to terrorist networks. Indeed, the recently concluded war in Iraq
represents only the first in a series of US struggles to contain the
proliferation of WMD and to shut off the potential supply of lethal
technologies to global terrorist networks.
As Michael Ignatieff concludes, America has not invested sufficiently in the
post-Cold War era to imposing a new structure (new military alliances, new
legal institutions, and new international development agencies) to be able to
adequately respond to emerging threats and problems.
The answer to the question of whether or not the US should remain engaged in
the Third World and in the world in general, however, gets complicated when we
attempt to take into consideration alternative visions of US foreign policy
strategies. The objective of the following section is to highlight the
strengths, weaknesses and validity of the different visions advanced for the
US foreign policy. The conclusions made will then inform our analysis of the
role and effectiveness of international security arrangements in the post-11
era as well as a better understanding of current US foreign policy and its
implications for the global world order.
9/11 and Responses to Uncertainty
The above analysis of the evolution of the international legal system and the
changes in the nature of threats to global security serves as a good point of
departure for a discussion about the foreign policy options at the disposal of
the US government.
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross advance that the competing visions for US
foreign policy range from “a narrow commitment to the basic safety of the
United States to an ambitious effort to secure permanent US global
preeminence.”
In this essay, I focus on four distinct views under the headings of
“Neoisolationism”, “Selective Engagement”, “Cooperative Security” and “Empire
Building”. Expanding on Posen’s and Ross’ analysis, I will show that these
views reflect varying theoretical assumptions about the nature of
international politics in general, about the behavior of individual states,
about the role of WMD and about the capacity that the US in fact has in
influencing international politics.
Neoisolationism
The neoisolationist position effectively calls for the maximum possible
withdrawal of the US from international politics and urges the US
administration to focus on the protection of “the security, liberty, and
property of the American people.”
In many ways, the inauguration address of George W. Bush in January 2001
resonated with the fundaments of neoisolationism. The majority of his speech
focused on the need for national unity and reinvigorating the domestic economy
through reforms in education, social security and tax cuts. He also stated,
“We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge.
We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared
new horrors.”
Besides this declaration of the need to improve America’s defense system,
there was no indication whatsoever of his vision for a US foreign policy. This
growing isolationist position of the US in international politics stemmed from
a unique combination of international and domestic conditions. Since the end
of the Cold War, there was no competitor to push the US back. On this subject,
Charles A. Kupchan notes,
Japan has been stuck in a prolonged recession.
China, with an economy smaller than California's, has aspirations but not the
capability to back them up. And the European Union has been preoccupied with
its own agenda – the introduction of a single currency, enlarging the union
and stabilizing the Balkans. There has been no counterpoise to U.S. power.
The neoisolationist position assumes that no entity has the capability or
interest to threaten US territorial integrity and political independence. This
fundamentally realist viewpoint assumes that the US is essentially
strategically immune.
Until 9/11, neoisolationists had a relatively strong influence on the Bush
administration. However, the terrorist threat has essentially silenced the
neoisolationist wing of the Republican Party, leaving a plenty of maneuvering
space for neoconservatives and selective engagement advocates. With the launch
of the War on Terrorism, Bush abandoned his initial goal of reinvigorating
domestic economy and committed himself to fighting the war of the “good”
against the “evil”.
Selective Engagement
“Selective engagement argues that the United States has an interest in great
power peace.”
This viewpoint emphasizes that the potential threat to US national security
essentially originates in the capacity of other great powers to deploy weapons
of mass destruction against the US. In the words of Condoleezza Rice, “Power
matters, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of
others to exercise it.”
As a result, it calls for steps to promote peace among the great powers
through balancing of relative military capabilities, containment and
deterrence. The US government is first and foremost accountable to its
citizens and as such, it must place US national interests on the top of the
list of its priorities. Many have argued that the exercise of US power is only
legitimate if it is used on behalf of someone or something else, preferably
through multilateral institutions and organizations such as NATO and the UN.
This reflects the Wilsonian ideal of the need to move from purely national to
humanitarian interests. Although indeed there is nothing wrong to pursue
actions benefiting all humanity, according to Condoleezza Rice and selective
engagement advocates in general, this would be considered only a second-order
effect. Selective engagement argues, “America’s pursuit of the national
interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace.”
As Posen and Ross point out, “selective
engagement advocates are worried about nuclear proliferation, but
proliferation in some countries matters more than in others.”
Aside of major powers, selective engagement pays a great deal of attention to
a short list of authoritarian states, which have either declared they possess
WMD or it is known or assumed they pursue steps to acquire them, and are
considered to present threat to US interests. Iraq, Iran and North Korea fall
into this category. Although Posen and Ross do not identify terrorist groups
as falling into the area of concern, I suggest that selective engagement is
best equipped to address the issue of global terrorism. It relies on the US
economic and military superiority and is not constrained by multilateral
institutions, which have not been designed to effectively tackle such an
issue. Although terrorist groups are not necessarily based on a predetermined
territory, they do need a certain amount of maneuvering capacity to operate
within existing states. Thus, regimes providing such an environment and
harboring terrorists need to be targeted. Although selective engagement views
cooperative security and NATO as useful means of tackling threats to security,
these are useful only as long as the US is in charge. The strategy of “pick &
choose” is based on the analysis of the potential threat to destabilizing
peaceful relations among major powers, to US national security, and to US
interests abroad (namely oil).
The selective engagement perspective is very much characteristic of the Bush
doctrine. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, provided a
statement delineating the list of the current administration’s priorities:
American foreign policy in a Republican
administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and
the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are:
·
To ensure that America's military
can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if
deterrence fails;
·
To promote economic growth and
political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary
system to all committed to these principles, including in the western
hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S.
national interest;
·
To renew strong and intimate
relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the
burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
·
To focus U.S. energies on
comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and
China, that can and will mold the character of the international political
system; and
·
To deal decisively with the threat
of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of
the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
Military force plays an important role in securing US interests abroad. It can
be applied to support clear political goals such as the expulsion of Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait, a regime change in Iraq, or to demand unconditional
surrender of Japan and Germany during World War II.
Despite the US military superiority, it cannot be involved everywhere.
Selective engagement would suggest that regional actors should deal with
conflicts where US interests are not at stake.
Using the American armed forces as the world's
“911” will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and
fuel concern among other great powers that the United States has decided to
enforce notions of “limited sovereignty” worldwide in the name of
humanitarianism.
Rice further acknowledged that such a broad definition of US national
interests would indeed have a great potential to backfire, as others would
arrogate the same authority to themselves. Demanding that the UN sanctions the
use of American military power, while simultaneously indicating that the US
would deploy it with or without it would be a mistake too. Yet, this is
precisely what has happened in the US efforts to seek a UN Security Council
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq in 2003.
According to selective engagement, foreign policy should be internationalist
but one which will proceed from the firm ground of the US national interest,
not from the interest of an illusory international community. The US national
interest is defined by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity,
and peace.
Cooperative Security
“The most important distinguishing feature of cooperative security is the
proposition that peace is indivisible.”
This perspective implies that the US has an interest in world peace. As
opposed to having its roots in realism, it essentially operates on liberal
premises that peace can be achieved through international multilateral
institutions, especially due to the engagement of world’s liberal democracies.
International institutions, particularly the UN, are to play a critical role
in coordinating the deterrence and defeat of aggression.
However, as has been shown elsewhere in this essay, the UN has been, from its
outset in 1945, unable to cope with international security dilemmas. The fact
that the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, China and France all have a veto power
to block any UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of military
force has effectively made it impossible for the UN Security Council to act.
“We could fix the UN on the back of an envelope in less than 30 minutes,”
and yet, the most logical reforms needed to be made in order to render the UN
Security Council effective are also the most unlikely. No permanent member of
the UN Security Council will accept its enlargement. No permanent member of
the UN Security Council will surrender its veto power.
The cooperative security perspective has been present to a great extent in the
Clinton administration. It rests on the premise of global interdependence and
thus implies the need for the US to work closely with other allies to restore
peace and stability in places of conflict. This perspective has been well
illustrated in Madeleine K. Albright’s statement to the UN on June 27, 1994.
Wars in one place are likely to spread; unsavory
military practices employed in one war will be employed in other wars. The use
of weapons of mass destruction will beget their use elsewhere; ethnic
cleansing will beget more ethnic cleansing. Refugees fleeing the nationalist
violence of one country will energize xenophobia in countries of refuge. The
organization of a global information system helps to connect these events by
providing strategic intelligence to good guys and bad guys alike; it connects
them politically by providing images of one horror after another in the living
rooms of the citizens of economically advanced democracies.
As a result, the security of the US and its allies is closely linked to
security threats, which are not necessarily dangerous to the US itself, but
which may have the potential of spilling over and have much more serious
implications. The key problem and my main criticism of cooperative security is
the assumption that individual states will indeed be willing and capable to
give up part of their sovereignty by subscribing to international conventions
and treaties regulating global economic and political life in order to attain
some greater good in the form of enhanced collective security. There will
always be defectors and free riders. Additionally, liberal democratic regimes
are first and foremost accountable to their citizens, and it may be difficult
for any government to justify sending troops to distant conflicts and risking
casualties. Lastly, cooperative security, with its heavy reliance on
multilateral arrangements, places a heavy burden on arms control agreements.
Given the mixed success of arms control agreements to date, it is unclear
whether the path of arms control efforts is the most appropriate one.
Determined states will continue to acquire and deploy weapons no matter
whether or not they signed an arms control treaty.
Empire Building
“Peace is the result of an imbalance of power in which US capabilities are
sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to
comfort all coalition members.”
This is a statement characteristic of the convictions held by the
neoconservative wing of the Republican Party.
As outlined in the Statement of Principles of the Project for the New American
Century chaired by William Kristol and includes Robert Kagan as a director,
the US needs to (1) increase defense spending significantly to be able to
carry out global responsibilities and to modernize US armed forces for the
future, (2) strengthen the US ties to democratic allies and to challenge
regimes hostile to US interests and values, (3) promote the cause of political
and economic freedom abroad, and (3) accept responsibility for its unique role
in preserving and extending an international order friendly to US security,
prosperity, and US principles.
The neoconservative vision of the role of the US
in international politics championed already by Paul Wolfowitz, then-under
secretary of defense for policy, in 1992, challenges the foundational
principles of the international legal system and accords the right to the US
to assume responsibility for US and global security. It advocates pre-emptive
strikes and ad hoc coalitions.
The neoconservative lobby became much stronger immediately after 9/11, as it
saw an opportunity to argue that Iraq presented a vital danger to the US, as
it manufactured weapons of mass destruction, which could end up in the hands
of terrorist groups. In line with the vision and principles of the Project for
a New American Century, and the neoconservative perspective in general, cases
have been made for the need to pursue regime change in Iraq and Iran. “Change
toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across
the Islamic world.”
Although there may seem lots of similarities
between selective engagement and empire building, the latter goes beyond
selective engagement’s logic of managing relations among present and potential
future powers. The objective is not merely the preservation of peace and
friendly relations among major powers, but the preservation of US political,
economic and military supremacy. In many ways, this kind of thinking may
appear as a dangerous fantasy. The extent to which the neoconservative lobby
has influenced the Bush administration is yet to be seen. However, any
attempts to establish the US as an empire imposing its values and rules
everywhere unconditionally could have some serious destabilizing repercussions
for the international order at large.
The most fully developed blueprint for precluding the rise of such peer
competitors appeared in a leaked report of the Bush administration’s Draft
Planning Guidance, to the New York Times in March 1992:
Our first objective is to prevent the
re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet
Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by
the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional
defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power
from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be
sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe,
East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the U.S. must
show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds
the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a
greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate
interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for
the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from
challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political
and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies
that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant
military position in the world.
The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and
instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international
law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic
forms of government and open economic systems. These objectives are especially
important in deterring conflicts or threats in regions of security importance
to the United States because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or
where we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations.
While the U.S. cannot become the world's "policeman," by assuming
responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent
responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only
our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously
unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may be
involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian
Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,
threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and
threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking.
Although an absolute primacy of the US in the world may deliver benefits both
to the US and to the world at large, there are several reasons for which any
effort at retaining US primacy at all costs may prove to be dangerous. First,
economic globalization together with the diffusion of communications
technologies will enable other states to develop foundations to compete with
the US. From a purely realist viewpoint, other states will aim to balance
against the US so as not to remain inferior both economically and militarily.
Some states, for numerous reasons, simply may not be willing to accept US
leadership. US empire building may therefore generate increased levels of
militarization, hatred and discontent all over the world, but primarily in
those countries where the negative consequences of US primacy will become most
visible and painful. Additionally, the US insistences on maintaining an
absolute leadership on all domains of global life may undermine any future
possibility for multilateral solutions to security dilemmas should the US in
fact wish to exploit those. The neoconservatives also give a great weight to
the importance of preventive wars. To date, the US has focused on rogue states
attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction such as Iraq, Iran and North
Korea. However, would the US be willing and capable to apply such measures to
larger states aspiring to the status of a world’s hegemon? In the end, we can
conclude that any effort to maintain the US hegemonic position is
unsustainable. The drive for ever-greater economic and military power will
continue to drain domestic resources, and in the end, may lose the necessary
domestic support for such an approach to US foreign policy.
Conclusion
Following the end of the Cold War, there was no
major identifiable threat to US security. The consequences of the end of the
Cold War however proved to be much more serious. Conflicts emerging in the
Third World do have a potentially destabilizing effect regionally and
internationally. As a response to the withdrawal of the US and the Soviet
Union from the Third World, new groups rose up to aspire to power and control
over resources. Disaffected groups often resorted to violence and the use of
WMD against civilians. International law and collective security arrangements
have consistently failed to prevent major local and regional wars and
conflicts from occurring.
In this essay, I argued that there are limits to
states’ sovereignty quite clearly delineated by the correlative duties and
responsibilities states have towards their citizens and the international
community. Any state’s legal and moral right to claim protection of the norm
of non-intervention is dependent upon it satisfying a certain minimum or basic
standards of humanity. These assertions point to two objectives of any
security strategy, which should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Rather,
they can be viewed as complementary and reinforcing one another. A failure to
act responsibly and thus pose security threats to either own citizens or the
international community at large implies the need for the international
community to have tools available to deal with such states to reduce the
threats at hand to the greatest extent possible. The US government’s
responsibility is first and foremost to protect US citizens and advance US
interests. This idea is complemented by a belief that efforts to advance US
interests will contribute to the advancement of all others.
Indeed, any research aiming to identify the most
expedient and appropriate foreign policy and national security strategy must
be firmly grounded in a good understanding of the nature of the contemporary
security environment as well as the nature of threats to security. I intended
to explore competing visions for US foreign policy and security strategies,
highlighting both their theoretical assumptions as well as real-life
articulations by US policy-makers. Matching theory with reality in this
instance proved fruitful. I identified the “Selective Engagement” approach as
the most adequate understanding and vision of the future US national security
strategy. While grounded in realism, selective engagement recognizes the key
role that the US has to play in the world today as a promoter of freedom,
democracy and human rights. Also recognizing that the US has neither interest
nor capacity to act and intervene everywhere, it recommends that the US
effectively focus on states and regions of the greatest political and economic
importance to the US, while relegating responsibilities for other conflicts to
regional actors.
As Michael Ignatieff argued, terror does not only
present a major threat to civilian populations, but it also attacks politics
and the very prospects for the maintenance of international peace, stability
and prosperity through diplomacy and non-violent means. Indeed, this is in
direct contradiction to the national interest of the US. Furthermore, as 9/11
illustrated, terrorism presents a direct threat to US national security as
well. Provided that the international legal system as promoted by the UN does
not make available sufficient guarantees and protection of citizens
everywhere, I argued that the US government must bear the ultimate
responsibility for the protection of US citizens and should not rely on the UN
or any other multilateral mechanism for its security. The notions of sovereign
equality of states, good domestic governance and upholding of friendly
relations among states were the three principal tenets upon which
international security was founded after World War II. However, sovereign
equality of states is an idea that is not realistically feasible and goes
contrary to the national interests and obligations of major powers towards
their citizens as well as towards each other. Good domestic governance never
materialized in many parts of the world, and the principle of non-intervention
is the only international tool that lends legitimacy to the justification of
self-centered policies pursued by individual states in the name of national
interests, cultural differences and the likes. As sovereign states remain the
only actors through which the international community seeks to implement
security, the challenge for the liberally minded community of states today is
to close the gap between the commitments to and the actual practice of
international law and human rights. The responsibility essentially lies in the
hands of the UN Security Council. However, if it fails to act in a way that
would provide the desired levels of security to those feeling threatened, the
responsibility must lie in the hands of the states themselves, namely those
ready, willing and capable of doing so.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Origins of Regime Change in
Iraq”, Proliferation Brief, Volume 6, Number 5, Wednesday, March 19, 2003,
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/
Rice, Condoleezza, “CAMPAIGN 2000 - PROMOTING THE NATIONAL INTEREST”, Foreign
Affairs, Jan-Feb 2000 v79 i1
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Official Statement by the
President (December 11, 2002)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021211-8.html
(March 27, 2003)
The White House, President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address (January 20,
2001)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html (May 5, 2003)
Condoleezza Rice, “CAMPAIGN 2000 - PROMOTING THE NATIONAL INTEREST”,
Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2000 v79 i1 p45
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Origins of Regime Change in
Iraq”, Proliferation Brief, Volume 6, Number 5, Wednesday, March 19, 2003,
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/