Book Review: Investing in Peace: How
Development Aid Can Prevent or Promote Conflict. By Robert J. Muscat.
Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe. 2002.
Review Author: Jan Kozak
Published in
Peace and
Conflict Monitor (January 26, 2004)
"Winston Churchill once said: “The
optimist sees opportunity in every danger. The pessimist sees danger in every
opportunity.” Optimists have had little cause for cheer in the first years of
the 21st century. Security and prosperity are under threat. Instability and
conflict are clouding a rosy view of the future."
– Klaus Schwab, International Herald
Tribune
At such an important moment in our history, Robert J. Muscat highlights the
opportunities as well as the dangers faced by the international development
community’s collective efforts to preventing violent conflict. Ultimately, the
success of development agencies in meeting this objective will depend on the
degree of optimism or pessimism regarding the potential effects of development
aid on conflict prevention. Although the threat of a major interstate war in
the post-Cold War era has diminished significantly, the phenomena of
intra-state conflicts, particularly in the Third World, have made the prospect
of peace and development an even more distant dream for millions of people
around the world. The international community, often failing to develop a
coherent policy and assemble an effective intervention coalition, has, in many
instances, largely failed to prevent such conflicts from emerging, thus
further encouraging future potential aggressors to discount the probability of
such intervention (p. 6).
Robert J. Muscat’s Investing in Peace is,
in certain ways, a pioneering effort and an attempt to outline the contours of
a consensus on a new policy framework, which the international development
community needs to adopt to more effectively address the root causes of
violent conflict in the 21st century. Contrary to much of
contemporary prescriptive literature, Muscat does not automatically assume
that economic development is always conflict-reducing. Through a series of
case studies and a detailed examination of the three cross-cutting themes of
development, aid and conflict, Muscat identifies development aid as perhaps
“the most powerful tool that the international community possesses as a means
of non-violent conflict resolution in the Third World today” (p. xvi). Rather
than portraying foreign aid as exemplifying Northern philanthropy or altruism,
however, Muscat makes an important acknowledgement. As most threats to global
security in the 21st century stem from Third World states’ chronic
intra-state conflict, state failure, and economic underdevelopment and
associated problems of social dislocation and environmental degradation, it is
in the interest of the donor nations to modify their approach to development
aid and conflict prevention, and place those on top of their foreign policy
agenda. Economic development can be conflict-reducing if development experts
succeed in acquiring an intimate knowledge of local histories, particularities
and circumstances, and accordingly tailor development strategies to
effectively prevent violent conflict from reversing years, if not decades, of
past development efforts. As such, conflict prevention through development aid
and cooperation should lie at the heart of all development efforts in the
Third World.
Muscat’s conclusions regarding the connection
between development and conflict prevention build on field experience and
prior research work of a large number of actors in the field of international
development, which pinpoint apparent successes and failures. Namely, he draws
on research findings of leading academics and institutions in the field, as
well as on concrete examples from the field provided by the experiences of
UNDP, IMF, World Bank staff and a number of bilateral donor agencies.
Unfortunately, his account could, only with great
difficulties, be considered as objective and free of bias. Given his
professional background (USAID, UNDP, World Bank), it should be of no surprise
that his conclusions suffer from some serious limitations and omissions.
Muscat delineates a comprehensive overview of the activities of the
international development community in an effort to evaluate its effectiveness
in preventing violent conflicts. Yet, the development doctrine, which
continues to define so much of the contemporary work of many development
agencies, is hardly questioned. The essential ingredients of successful
development remain the same, while any failure to prevent conflict is ascribed
to inadequate coordination among donors, a failure, on the part of donors, to
recognize that even seemingly apolitical aid such as technical assistance can
have political implications for violent conflict, or to weak commitment or
state capacity on the part of the recipient nations to diligently follow the
rules of the game.
When examining the potentially
conflict-exacerbating effects of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), he
advances the argument that “evidence does not show significant association
between SAPs in general and subsequent conflict, except for the occasional
‘IMF riot’ and the exceptional case of Yugoslavia” (p. 199). While this
correlation may not be supported by econometric research using measures of
“overall inequality”, qualitative research suggesting that inequality between
regions or groups – known as “horizontal inequality” may be, in fact,
responsible for the eruption of violent conflict.
Obtained results in this regard are reducible to employed data sets.
Additionally, multiple sections of his book focus on the failure of
development agencies to foresee the negative economic impacts of their work in
the Third World, without further examining the conflict-exacerbating
implications of such failures. In an attempt to provide a balanced view,
Muscat mentions, on the margins, Joseph Stiglitz and his criticisms of IMF and
the US Treasury’s roles in exacerbating the 1997-1998 crises in East Asia on
page 200.
The book amounts to nothing more than a series of
observations and evaluations of past efforts of development agencies in the
Third World and the oft-missing “conflict prevention lens” in their work. In
other words, as an overview, it adequately informs the general audience that
conflict prevention has been largely missing in the work of the international
development community, yet their activities clearly are of high importance to
the problem at hand. As Muscat illustrates development aid can both
mitigate/prevent and exacerbate societal tensions in particular and violent
conflict in general.
Although he recognizes that it is hard to codify
a single unified formula that development agencies could adopt to more
effectively contribute to conflict prevention through their work, I would have
wished to see a more systematic approach permitting the reader to at least
sketch a rough image of the nature of such a formula. While practitioners in
the field of development cooperation might find this book useful, Muscat’s
policy prescriptions are too disorganized and scattered throughout the book
for anyone to be able to devise clear and effective conflict prevention
strategies. Instead, we learn that it is important to abandon any attempt to
use cookie-cutter formulas and to deal with individual scenarios on a
case-by-case basis. For readers interested in a more systematic policy guide,
I would certainly recommend the Development Assistance Committee Guidelines:
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict published by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development in 2001 or consult works prepared by the
International Development Research Center and associated organizations.
I was equally disappointed by Muscat’s failure to
wholeheartedly delve into the question of democracy and its potentially
conflict-reducing implications. Again, Muscat seems contented with a basic
overview of existing literature, without attempting to, at a minimum, suggest
tangible ways in which specific forms of democracy may be appropriate in
particular contexts. He certainly fails to mention major research work on the
subject conducted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, which seems to suggest that democracy may in fact be a viable
solution for conflict prevention in any context as long as its design closely
reflects the wishes and aspiration of the particular population in question.
Despite some of these shortcomings, I have
enjoyed reading Investing in Peace. Muscat draws on a rich set of real
life examples of what has and has not worked, and as such will provide a good
overview and understanding of the intricate relationships between development,
aid and conflict to anyone interested in the issues at hand. Indeed,
representing one of the pioneering works in the field, it is only
understandable that the reader will likely be left with more questions to ask
rather than questions definitely answered. That should only be a good sign, as
Muscat’s volume will surely provoke others to undertake additional research
and refine his observations, thus further strengthening the body of knowledge
in this still largely neglected field.
Bibliography
Robert J. Muscat, Investing in
Peace: How Development Aid Can Prevent or Promote Conflict, Armonk,
New York: M. E. Sharpe. 2002.
Macartan Humphreys, “Economics and
Violent Conflict”, Human Security Bulletin: the Canadian Consortium on
Human Security, October 2002, Vol. 1, No. 3,
http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info/archive/en_v1i3/research_3.htm
(January 19, 2004)
Klaus Schwab, “Shaping prospects for a
dangerous world”, International Herald Tribune, January 19, 2004,
http://www.iht.com./articles/125562.htm (January 19, 2004)