“Conflict Prevention:
Development for Democracy”
By Jan Kozak, December 2003, UN
University for Peace, San Jose, Costa Rica (Currently being reviewed by the
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, American University, Washington
DC, United States)
PART I
Introduction
“The prevention of conflict begins
and ends with the promotion of human security and human development.”
–
Kofi Annan
Although the threat of a major inter-state war greatly diminished during the
second half of the 20th century, Third World states have proven
increasingly vulnerable to intra-state conflicts particularly following the
end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the superpowers from the Third
World. Pressures for political liberalization combined with demands for
economic liberalization have undermined the legitimacy and capacity of Third
World states to adopt mechanisms through which to reconcile societal
differences and thus maintain order through non-violent means. Violent
conflicts have emerged in response to growing state-promulgated repression,
economic underdevelopment and political marginalization of various social,
ethnic and religious groups. This has, in many instances, triggered a vicious
cycle of poverty where violent conflict exacerbated economic underdevelopment
and vice versa.
In response to these observations, the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention
of Deadly Conflict suggested in its 1997 report that the emergence of violent
conflict can be effectively prevented by “creating capable states with
representative governance based on the rule of law, with widely available
economic opportunity, social safety nets, protection of human rights, and
robust civil societies” (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,
CCPDC 1997, xviii). However, who should be the one to “create” such states?
What does “representative governance” mean and how should it be brought about?
What do we specifically mean by “social safety nets” and where should we seek
resources to implement such policies in instances where Third World states are
unable to provide for them? In other words, who constitutes the ultimate
source of agency in the process of Third World development? Should change rest
in the hands of governments in the Third World? Or, perhaps, should it rest
with the international community at large however defined? Lastly, what are
the threats and obstacles to attaining such objectives and hence to
effectively preventing violent conflicts from emerging in the Third World?
Given the positive correlation between violent conflict and economic
underdevelopment, conflict prevention must lie at the heart of any development
policy if sustainable development, peace and prosperity are to be achieved.
In this essay, I focus on the role of development and democratization in
preventing violent conflict, and particularly on the role of bilateral
development agencies in catalyzing positive change in terms of a transition
from economic underdevelopment and radicalized conflict-prone situations
towards sustainable development and democratic mechanisms with the potential
to reconcile societal differences through constructive dialogue and
consensus-building.
First, I identify the root causes of intra-state conflict in the Third World
today and elaborate on the contribution of the democratic peace thesis to our
understanding of conflict prevention on the intra-state level. (See
“Underdevelopment as a Cause of Conflict”).
Second, I explain why governments in the Third World have in many instances
chosen to postpone democratization efforts in favor of economic development as
a result of the destabilizing effects of the dual processes of economic and
political liberalization. Structural adjustment programs have in many cases
led to cutbacks in social spending and reductions in the delivery of the most
basic social services. When such economic reforms were coupled with inadequate
protection of human rights and civil liberties, few options were available to
those left on societal margins but resort to violence in an effort to protect
the little they had left.
At the beginning of the 21st century, observing the recent
political and economic developments around the world, we can easily reach two
conclusions: First, the Third Wave of democratization is now over. Second, the
effectiveness of liberal economic reforms pursued in the Third World
throughout the 1980s and 1990s is highly questionable. According to the July
2003 annual report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), despite
the efforts of governments and multilateral organizations in recent decades,
data describing the state of the world remain alarming. There are almost 1.2
billion people living in extreme-poverty; almost 50 countries are involved in
war at some level; the number of AIDS victims continues to rise; 54 countries
are poorer today than they were in 1990; inequality among nations continues to
rise; environmental destruction continues to accelerate; and finally,
political and economic institutions are on the verge of collapse. The same
report, however, suggests steps through which to reverse these trends,
particularly by calling for improving democratic governance and promoting
political participation. (See “Constraints for Development, Democracy and
Limits to Conflict Prevention”).
Subsequently, I examine the evolution of foreign assistance over the course of
the past fifty years. I also explore some of the recent changes in the fields
of international development cooperation and democracy assistance, and how
those reflect our understanding of conflict prevention and the interdependence
of development, security and democracy. I draw some conclusions, which will
inform my discussion in the subsequent section on the role of the donor
community at large in determining the future course of development and
democratization in the Third World. (“Democracy Aid: Foreign Assistance
Integrated”).
I then take the case study of Uganda and explain how both national development
policies and development cooperation agencies succeeded in laying a foundation
on which to build a pluralist liberal democracy. Uganda possesses certain key
characteristics typically associated with Third World states. In certain
respects, it lacks “domestic” sovereignty as state institutions and governing
elites still do not enjoy unconditional legitimacy even though they obviously
enjoy legal sovereignty under international law. It lacks unconditional
legitimacy of state boundaries as a result of intrastate and interstate
conflicts that have plagued the north of the country to date. And the country
still suffers from distorted and dependent development. Yet, the prospects of
Uganda becoming a pluralist liberal democracy today can be much brighter than
in many other Third World countries. The ultimate outcome depends on the
choices made by the incumbent government regarding the much-needed transition
from a “no-party” to “multi-party” pluralist democratic system over the next
few years, and implementation of policies aimed at restoring peace in the
North and integrating the northern opposition into formal democratic politics.
If it moves towards political pluralism, Uganda may become a genuine
multi-party democracy. On the other hand, the government may resort to the
deployment of repressive measures against its opposition. Additionally, a
failure to abandon the “no-party” system may result in violent conflict fueled
by the increasingly vocal opposition disaffected with the status quo of
political affairs in Uganda and demanding a radical change. Undoubtedly, the
international donor community can play an important role in the development
and democratization processes, which in turn can determine whether we will see
sustained peace in Uganda, or whether the country will once again become
trapped in violent conflict. (“Development for Democracy: Case Study of
Uganda”)
Underdevelopment as a Cause of
Conflict
Robert J. Muscat (2002) identifies two prevalent views on fundamental sources
of violent conflict in the Third World today. First, the “primordialist
perspective” suggests that multi-ethnic states are naturally prone to violent
conflict, as differences among ethnic groups are so sharply defined that
political compromise in many instances is perceived by opposing groups as both
impossible and undesirable.
However, provided that most societies in the world today are composed of
multiple ethnic, racial, religious, social and other groups, this assertion
might not be tenable. Why is it that some multi-ethnic societies enjoy
stability and high levels of security and prosperity, while others continue to
be immersed in poverty and violent conflict? Many modern consolidated
democracies are composed of such diverse populations and yet, the prospect of
violent conflict is generally thought to be minimal. It is for this reason
therefore that it may be useful to examine the connection between different
regime types and the capacity of governments to reconcile societal differences
through non-violent means. As will be shown throughout this essay, the
capacity of states to do so is largely determined by the extent to which the
exercise of power by governments is legitimate and by the economic resource
base available to support this exercise. In turn, legitimacy is determined by
representativeness of the given government, while the economic resource base
is determined by available natural resources, but equally so by a broad set of
economic, social and environmental policies aimed at attaining economic growth
that will fuel sustainable development. Taking a closer look at the
interdependence of these variables can enable us to identify potentially
problematic areas (i.e. lack of development ownership, corruption, weak
judiciary system, etc.), which deserve the attention of policy makers in their
efforts to prevent conflict and foster stability, security and economic
growth. Regime types therefore serve as useful concepts that can help us
categorize states according to their ranking on the different variables
outlined above and then generate analyses of possible threats of violent
conflicts under different regime types and how conflicts can be prevented
given the vastly different economic, environmental, social and political
circumstances characterizing each individual state.
I categorize states into three types of political regimes, all of which stand
on one continuum. I define democracy as a political regime, which allows for
the adjudication of human disputes through negotiation and compromise
(non-violent conflict resolution), enables people to live under laws of their
choosing (self-determination), and requires an effective, equitable and
accountable exercise of power by governments (inclusive political
participation and upholding of civil and political rights). The adjudication
of human disputes through negotiation and compromise implies that the use of
violent force to reconcile societal differences is unnecessary in democratic
political regimes. All stakeholder groups have avenues to voice their concerns
and advance their interests through democratic mechanisms. In order to meet
the requirements of self-determination and inclusive political participation,
all social groups must be able to participate in the process of selecting
their leaders and policies through regular and fair elections. In total, civil
and political liberties must be firmly upheld and protected by an independent
judiciary system to make democratic politics possible. On the other end of the
continuum are autocracies characterized by the lack of most of the elements
present in democratic systems.
Ted Gurr classifies countries, which do not fall into either one of the
categories of autocracies or democracies, as Anocracies. He observes that
democracies and autocracies, while embodying very different forms of
governance, share a similarity in terms of their capacity to maintain central
authority, control the policy agenda, and manage political dynamics (Gurr &
Marshall, 2002). He suggests that the sharp increase in the number of
Anocracies during the past 25 years should be a cause of serious concern, as
they are much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of civil wars and reversals to
autocracy than democracies are. His observations are similar to my earlier
analysis of the threats to many Third World states’ security and stability.
Lacking unconditional legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, as well as
internal cohesion and capacity to perform essential tasks expected from a
state, many Third World countries currently experiencing radical economic and
political changes are much more vulnerable to intrastate (and to a lesser
extent interstate) conflict. This is why Anocracies should constitute the key
target group for democracy aid.
Additionally, it is also useful to bear in mind the economic circumstances in
which such political transitions are taking place. Implications for the
regime’s stability, security and prosperity will vary depending on whether the
state pursues (a) democratic development, (b) non-democratic development, or
whether it experiences stagnation under democratic rule (democratic
non-development) or whether we are dealing with states experiencing (d)
non-democratic non-development.
States undergoing political transition, while simultaneously pursuing
participatory development policies, are more likely to manage societal
differences via non-violent means. In the context of non-democratic
non-development is most conducive to violent conflict.
The democratic peace thesis has been advanced in the past to explain why
modern consolidated free-market democracies do not go to war with each other.
However, no attempt thus far has been made to explore the implications this
thesis may have on our analysis of conflict and conflict-prevention on the
intra-state level. This essay suggests that the democratic peace thesis is
equally applicable in our efforts to sketch some of the possible paths that
Third World states can take to prevent the emergence of violent conflicts on
the intra-state level. Resonating with the democratic peace thesis, the CCPDC
asserts that efforts aimed at conflict prevention can be supported by a
network of interlocking international regimes underwritten by the rule of law”
(CCPDC 1997, xviii). Similarly, Christopher declared in 1993 that
international security in the post-Cold War era could be promoted through the
creation of a framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing institutions
(Christopher, 1993). Thus, with higher degrees of a state’s integration into
international dispute settlement mechanisms and other global and regional
bodies and institutions, the likelihood of inter-state conflict should be
reduced. This assertion is supported by the observation that
possibilities for major inter-state wars and violent conflicts have
substantially diminished thanks to the growing recognition of the efficacy of
international dispute settlement mechanisms as embodied in both global and
regional institutional arrangements designed to regulate a broad array of
matters of international concern.
Having become aware of the conflict-mitigating power engendered in such
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund or supranational organizations such as the
European Union, the international community has increasingly come to demand
that democracy and democratic governance be recognized as a human right to
which all are entitled (Franck, 1992). By defining democracy and democratic
governance as a human right and an overriding international norm, it is widely
believed the liberally minded international community can (and, in fact, is
obliged to) engage in activities abroad, which have as their primary goal the
promotion of democracy and democratic governance. This is to be done in a
collective effort to spread the benefits of the democratic peace thesis beyond
the frontiers of today’s democratic world. Similarly, John J. Mearsheimer
(1994) identifies two dominant views in Western policy-making: First, the
institutionalist approach discussed above and second, the normative argument
about the power of Western liberal norms and the need to spread democracy and
capitalism throughout the rest of the world to ensure global peace. He
subsequently concludes that existing institutions are ill-equipped to prevent
modern day conflicts in the Third World, as their intervention would go
contrary to the still dominant principles of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Although he has not actually contributed much towards
the “institutionalist” literature, his assertions indeed point to the
weaknesses of the contemporary system. The effectiveness of today’s
institutions in dealing with instances of gross human rights violations and
preventing intra-state conflicts is severely constrained by contemporary
international law. In this essay, I argue that institutions do indeed have an
important role to play. However, it is ultimately the liberally minded
international community, led by industrialized and consolidated democracies,
which needs to deploy resources to foster international cooperation, peace and
prosperity through conflict prevention at early stages before societal
conflicts become entrenched and lead to violence.
With the increasing sophistication and destructive capability of modern
warfare, the economic costs of interstate wars have come to be seen as by far
outstripping the prospect of any gains that conflicting parties could expect
following the conclusion of the war. Institutional developments, which marked
the second half of the 20th century, coupled with the strengthening
of liberal economic and political norms, namely those of free markets and
democracy, helped pacify relations among states and create a consensus on the
need to develop non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms. A similar
conclusion should be made in the context of intra-state conflicts. It can also
be empirically supported by simply pointing to the economic costs of
intra-state wars. Robert Muscat observes, for example, that the opportunity
cost of the civil war in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1988 was $1.5 billion (20
per cent of 1988 GDP), whereas in Rwanda, GDP fell to approximately 46
percent, in Bosnia to 27 percent and in Lebanon to 24 percent of their
pre-conflict peaks (Muscat, 2002, 7).
In turn, it can be concluded that the “primordialist” explanation is virtually
always simplistic and insufficient to explain root causes of conflict and thus
prescribe effective strategies for conflict prevention. As Muscat argues,
“apparently primordial fears and hatreds often obscure and mix with hard-nosed
issues of economics and power” (Muscat, 2002, xiii). Additionally, as Third
World states’ economies progressively integrate into the global economy, they
are likely to become much more vulnerable to external political pressures and
economic shocks, which may only further exacerbate economic failure, societal
radicalization and violent conflict. This necessitates the development of
institutions that have the legitimacy, authority and effective tools to
mediate social conflicts. “Participatory and democratic institutions, the rule
of law, and social insurance are all components of a strategy to enhance
resilience to volatility in the external environment (Rodrick, 1998, 28).
Otherwise, the likelihood of violent conflict will remain. We can posit
therefore that participatory equitable sustainable economic development plays
a crucial role in preventing violent conflict in Third World states.
In other words, there is an obvious need to abandon the “primordialist
perspective” as the primary or sole explanation for the emergence of violent
ethnic conflict. Instead, a much greater importance must be assigned to
underlying structural causes of conflict, which can determine the future
course of development in any given scenario well before any signs of violent
conflict become apparent. Among such structural causes, we need to include
issues pertaining to culture and subjective cognitive view of an individual or
a group vis-à-vis the rest of the society, which can leas to alienation, and
cultural, religious and ethnic exclusion. Of equal importance are questions
related to political marginalization and exclusion from formal decision-making
processes and social issues particularly in regards to social exclusion and
discrimination based on, for instance, race, ethnicity, or religion. At last,
but certainly not the least, questions of economic exclusion and lack of
access to or control over natural resources can constitute important causes of
violent conflict as well. Each one of the aforementioned root causes of
conflict will require distinct sets of policies and development strategies to
effectively prevent violent conflict.
The application of the democratic peace thesis to the intra-state setting
allows us to conclude that the chances of violent conflict erupting will be
greatly reduced by creating democratic mechanisms that allow ethnic and
religious groups to reconcile their differences through non-violent means. The
more predictable the political system, the more likely it is that individual
groups will believe resort to violence is unnecessary. Why is this not
happening in the world today? What are the constraints and limitations to
development and democratization in the Third World today? And why is the
involvement of the international development community imperative to the
successful attainment of the objectives of development and democratization?
The subsequent section aims to answer these questions.
As David Hamburg declares, “Like it or not, regional and civil conflicts and
religious hatreds have become everyone’s business” (Hamburg, 2002, 11). It is
the understanding that instability in the Third World in fact poses threats to
global stability and prosperity that serves as the point of departure for this
essay, which aims to delineate the ways in which the international development
community may contribute to non-violent resolution of societal differences,
inequalities, and grievances in the Third World before these lead to violent
conflicts.
Constraints for Development,
Democracy and Limits to Conflict Prevention
The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed the Third Wave of
democratization—a term coined by Samuel Huntington to encapsulate a truly
global democratic revolution, which triggered dramatic transitions from
authoritarian to democratic systems of government within countries in Southern
Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe between 1974 and 1990
(Huntington, 1991 and 1992). In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union collapsed
and 15 post-Soviet republics gained their independence. Several African
countries have seen the demise of many one-party regimes and a gradual
transition towards more democratic regimes (Carothers 2002). Similar trends
towards greater political liberalization can be observed in some Middle
Eastern countries, although the prospect of the emergence of full-fledged
democracies any time soon seems elusive at best. These developments have been
positively and unambiguously welcomed by observers around the world, who
assume that once on the path of political liberalization, full-fledged
democracies would emerge everywhere as part of a global trend. Models of
liberal representative democracy have been accepted as the best method of
managing political affairs (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 1998). Yet, the optimism
concerning the possibility of a more democratic and peaceful world emerging
from the Third Wave of democratization might have been premature. It may be
too early to say whether the course of future history can be predetermined in
such a simple linear fashion. As some observers have recently noted,
democratically elected regimes in many parts of the world are routinely
ignoring constitutional constraints and depriving citizens of their basic
rights and freedoms (Carothers 2002; Zakaria 1997). Fareed Zakaria calls this
disturbing phenomenon “the rise of illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997).
Similarly, Thomas Carothers explains that “many countries that policy makers
and aid practitioners persist in calling ‘transitional’ are not in transition
to democracy” (Carothers 2002, 6).
In a parallel fashion, the end of the Cold War unleashed forces of
globalization to unprecedented levels. Neoliberal policies advocated by
governments and multilateral economic institutions, coupled with elevated
expectations for rapid democratization in parts of the world previously
dominated by totalitarian regimes and, at times, unrealistic aspirations on
the part of the peoples living through this era of radical change, all played
an important role in determining the future course that history would take
throughout the 1990s and well into the 21st century. The bonds,
which during the Cold War inextricably linked state and society through the
imposition of the superpowers’ dictatorship, have been weakened and political
elites in many parts of the world attempting to grapple with the challenges
that the end of the Cold War wrought, have increasingly found themselves
powerless and unable to maintain their legitimacy and monopoly on the use of
force.
Observers, who suggested that the end of the Cold War would foster a more
democratic and peaceful world, might have been wrong. It was often implied
that with the disappearance of the only other alternative to capitalism, the
power of globalization driven by the neoliberal doctrine would create
conditions conducive to greater freedom, security and prosperity everywhere.
At the end of the day, neither of these propositions seems to be justified. As
Amartya Sen argues,
There is a deep complementarity between
individual agency and social arrangements… It is important to give
simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom and to the
force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom (Sen
1999, xii).
The overemphasis on the role of individual freedom—a key tenet of the
neoliberal doctrine—in securing development has, in many instances, triggered
violent reactions from segments of societies, who continued to be denied such
freedoms despite the changes in political discourse. They perceived both the
Western world and their respective authorities as imposing yet another form of
oppression that stifled their right to individual realization and collective
self-determination. Within this neoliberal framework, which inordinately
privileged individual freedom, the chances for those on the margins of society
to secure their own freedom were seen to be significantly diminished.
As a response to the weakened position of political elites in the Third World,
groups and individuals have sought to claim power and legitimacy, which would
enable them to advance their specific agendas irrespective of the potential
implications for security and development of other segments of their
respective societies. By deploying tools of identity politics, privatized
warfare, and exploitation of societal divides, these emerging forces have
challenged young democracies and in many cases chosen to bypass democratic
processes and resort directly to violence as the only perceived effective
solution. Intrastate conflicts today represent some of the deadliest disasters
destabilizing Third World states, as they pose challenges to human, state and
global security. At the end of history’s bloodiest century, nearly all nations
are at peace with each other, but many are at war with themselves (Stremlau &
Sagasti 1998). When anxiety, fear and intolerance dominate politics, the
possibility of reconciling differences through peaceful and non-violent means
will perhaps remain elusive.
As Thomas Carothers notes, “by far the majority of Third Wave countries have
not achieved relatively well-functioning democracy or do not seem to be
deepening or advancing whatever democratic progress they have made” (Carothers
2002, 9). In many parts of the Third World, prospects for democracy are
undermined by ongoing challenges to the successful completion of the processes
of state-making, security and development. Third World states do not always
enjoy the benefits of unconditional legitimacy and stateness that developed
nations do. Dealing with legacies of colonialism, lack of internal cohesion,
easy susceptibility to conflict and economic underdevelopment, Third World
states often need to prioritize national security concerns over issues
pertaining to human rights and democracy. As has been noted in the past,
democracy can often be seen as a luxury that only territorially consolidated
and industrialized states can afford (Ayoob, 1995). The concepts of
state-making and security are closely related. While the objectives of
state-making should be understood in terms of consolidation of the monopoly on
the use of violence in the hands of credible, accountable and effective
governments, security concerns usually relate to the elimination of internal
and external threats to the processes of state-making. Although I would
certainly not argue that the successful accomplishment of both of these
objectives inevitably leads to the formation of democratic regimes, I submit
that the successful completion of the process of state-making and high levels
of state security are essential preconditions for democracies to emerge.
“Though debates over modalities of achieving democracy continue, especially
in fractured societies, there is a general agreement on the basic features of
democratic participation” (Barnes 2001, 87). There is no right way to bring
about democracy. Efforts at political and economic liberalization must
therefore be culturally and historically informed to adequately reflect
people’s aspirations, understandings of freedom and their right to
self-determination. Unless political liberalization processes are accompanied
with measures to address the inherent causes of Third World states’
insecurity, peace in many Third World states will remain a dream in the hearts
of millions of people living through conflict and violence rather than a
reality.
I advance the proposition that democratization, conceived in terms of
participatory development, is both central to the prevention of violent
conflicts and thus enhancement of Third World states’ security. Participatory
development mechanisms can spur sustainable economic development, which can
support the process of state making and simultaneously enhance Third World
states’ security. The development of a participatory culture can, in turn,
enable democratic pluralism to emerge in the long term.
This proposition challenges wide-spread beliefs about democracy as a luxury
that only developed, industrialized nation-states can afford. Simultaneously,
however, this essay recognizes that contemporary threats to Third World
states’ security also undermine the chances of successful democratization. In
order to effectively tackle these problems, it is imperative that steps are
taken to address the historic legacy of colonialism as well as global
inequalities, which effectively prevent Third World states from fully and
meaningfully participating in the global political economy today. This
assertion should not be interpreted as subordinating the goals of
democratization to the objectives of development and state-making. Seeds for
democracy must be planted at early stages of development and state-making to
ensure that pluralist democracy can emerge as a result of development
processes.
Given the growing threats to security and the processes of state-making in the
Third World, international policy makers should not remain content with the
few genuine democratization accomplishments witnessed at the end of the Third
Wave. Instead, they should aim to reinforce global movements toward greater
peace and democracy by pursuing policies that address the root causes of
violence and insecurity in the world today. Progress has always been
accompanied by resistance and the emergence of new challenges, which must be
tackled early to prevent a reversal from democratic to authoritarian regimes
and stem the onset of violent conflicts.
With this important critical theoretical foundation having been laid, this
essay aims to contribute to our understanding of the role of bilateral
development agencies in conflict prevention via measures aimed at development,
good governance and rule of law in the Third World. Democratization efforts of
the international development community in the past have excessively focused
on promoting good governance, free and fair elections, respect for human
rights and a wide array of other issues, while not placing sufficient emphasis
on concerns relating to state-making and security. Additionally, donors and
development agencies have all too often failed to take into account the impact
of other donor programs, which in some cases, might have significantly reduced
the overall effectiveness of democratization programs. Aid programs designed
to promote democratization in the Third World must simultaneously take into
consideration issues pertaining to social and economic development and their
impacts on Third World states’ security. Unless such an integrated approach is
adopted, democratization programs of bi-lateral development agencies
presumably will continue to deliver unsatisfactory results.
I argue that democracy aid can prevent potential conflicts and engender
genuine democratic consolidation. Democracy aid packaged as development aid
requires governments to engage all stakeholders in the process of identifying
key development priorities through equitable participatory processes. In this
sense, donor agencies and democracy aid can assume a catalytic role rather
than a role of an outsider imposing specific conditions on the recipient
state. It is through such processes that the legitimacy of governments can be
strengthened, as they are perceived as pursuing development policies, which
are both legitimate and inclusive (thus not alienating any major social,
ethnic, or religious groups). Second, technical assistance, as part of
democracy aid, should focus on institutionalizing research efforts on national
development policy-making. In this way, governments’ capacity is further
strengthened as consultation processes with the various stakeholder groups can
be enriched with information on the likely impacts of proposed strategies and
policies on successfully implementing sustainable development, which would
secure stability and security required for successfully enhancing democratic
rule.
Democracy Aid: Foreign Assistance
Integrated
Foreign assistance, as a humanitarian effort, was originally designed to
support development in the Third World. Today, foreign assistance constitutes
an important part of most developed nations’ foreign policies, defined to
incorporate trade and investments in developing countries along with grants
and loans as integral elements of development assistance strategies addressing
political, economic, social, cultural and environmental issues. As part of
foreign aid policies, foreign assistance has become a means by which developed
nations can determine the course of development and democratization in the
Third World. Whether or not such an involvement is desirable very much depends
on the kinds of development strategies that Northern bilateral development
agencies choose to pursue. Given the mixed record of these agencies’
involvement in the Third World, the subject of foreign assistance itself is
somewhat controversial.
In its initial stages, foreign assistance is aimed at “facilitating the
take-off of nascent economies, in meeting basic human needs or promoting human
rights, and in redressing structural inequities between North and South (Hook
1996). However, as the newly industrialized economies, particularly these in
East and Southeast Asia, entered the global market and increasingly competed
against Northern producers, donor countries began to reform their foreign
assistance programs by placing greater emphasis on liberalizing trade,
increasing investments, freeing up capital flows and promoting greater
economic cooperation. In this way, they were convinced that foreign assistance
could meet the objectives of poverty eradication, and ensure that investments
and trade would generate returns at home.
Economic liberalization appeared to have created conditions favorable for
economic growth and development in countries where the process of state making
was complete or where governments were strong and possessed the tools
necessary to maintain stability and order. Paradoxically, the strongest
economic growth occurred where governments remained central to the overall
management of the economy. In countries where political power was diffuse and
the governments were weak, they failed, as the adverse effects of such
economic reforms could not be tackled effectively.
The international development community has come to play an increasingly
important role in determining (and sometimes dominating) both the course of
development in the Third World and the character of North-South relations with
the progressive recognition of the constraints on development, state-building
and democratization in the Third World as outlined in the previous section. It
was acknowledged that both the neoliberal doctrine and foreign assistance
policies had to be modified to better respond to the needs of Third World
states and to create conditions which would better serve the interests of the
developed world.
Structural Adjustment Programs were often tied to conditions of political
liberalization, with a particular emphasis on improving state institutions and
promoting free, fair and regular elections. The dual processes of economic and
political liberalization have, however, often further exacerbated Third World
states’ insecurity rather than promoted economic growth, development and
democracy.
The increasing reliance on foreign borrowing and economic liberalization
policies such as structural adjustment programs rendered weak economies
increasingly vulnerable to external political and economic shocks such as
capital flight, fluctuations in foreign stock markets, foreign currency
volatility, and radical changes in trade and investment patterns, as well as
violent conflicts and insurgencies. The debt crisis, beginning with Mexico’s
declaration in 1993 that it could no longer service its foreign debts,
followed by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 only further attests to the
fragility of these emerging markets. African countries, struggling with the
legacies of colonialism and the lack of stable governments, experienced a
number of violent interstate and intrastate conflicts, which further
devastated their economies.
Cross border issues, such as rapid population growth, environmental
degradation, and health problems especially the spread of the AIDS epidemic,
were progressively included on the list of development priorities, as they
were perceived as potentially threatening both to regional and global
security. Detailed evidence has been accumulated on the interdependence of
Third World states’ security, security of developed industrialized nations and
global security in general to justify the need for the international community
to undertake collective efforts to address the root causes of insecurity in
the Third World (Pinstrup-Andersen 2003; Ferraro 2003; Sachs 2003, and
others). Additionally, Third World insecurity has come to place an
increasingly growing burden on the international community. Only in the 1990s,
donors pledged more than US$60 billion to support recovery in war-torn
countries (USAID, 2002). In other words, as Jeffrey Sachs suggests, “It would
be naïve to think that the North can remain an island of stability and
prosperity in a global sea of poverty and unrest” (Sachs 2001, 1).
The eradication of poverty in the Third World came to be seen as a way of
expanding the portion of population that is active and contributes to economic
growth. Efforts at promoting good governance, curbing corruption and improving
the rule of law were introduced just recently to assist the process of
state-making. The 2003 UNDP Human Development Report suggests that to make aid
more effective, donors should focus on demanding stronger governance,
increased ownership and more transparent partnerships for development (UNDP
2003, 145).
Realizing that ‘cookie-cutter’ types of structural adjustment programs were
not equally effective in all environments, the responsibility of identifying
development priorities was progressively transferred into the hands of Third
World states themselves.
Yet, even after such seemingly radical adjustments to the daily business of
development politics and economics, as illustrated, for instance, by the
introduction of the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, the
results do not seem to be delivered to the degree anticipated, as widespread
poverty continues to plague populations around the world often giving rise to
economic and political instability, which in the most extreme instances
escalates to violent conflicts. The 2003 UNDP Human Development Report
provides ample evidence in this regard. It states that the world in 2003 has
seen even more violent conflict, accompanied by heightened international
tension and fear of terrorism and suggests that eradicating poverty should
contribute to a safer world—the vision of the Millennium Declaration (UNDP
2003).
In order to prevent violent conflict, the UNDP HDR argues, there is a need to
implement reforms in the Third World addressing three fundamental issues.
First, economic reforms are necessary to establish macroeconomic stability.
Second, strong institutions are needed to enforce the rule of law and control
corruption. Thirdly, it champions social justice and the right of citizens to
have a say in processes and decisions, which affect them, are compulsory.
Although it does not explicitly specify democracy as a desirable objective,
combining the three sets of issues outlined above, I would argue, makes it
clear that democratic regimes are best equipped to tackle them.
To clarify, democratic forms of governance and neoliberal policies can provide
guarantees for sustainable development and equitable distribution of gains
from economic growth, and thus reduce the likelihood of violent conflict
resulting from growing societal tensions. Democratic governments enjoy
relatively unconditional recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of their
citizens and thus are less likely to face situations in which opposition
groups resort to violence. Liberal democracy, stability and security go hand
in hand together. Yet, it may be difficult to pursue democratization reforms
and economic liberalization policies concurrently without paying adequate
attention to security concerns. “Donors need to focus as much on engaging
groups and individuals with incentives to engage in violence as on those
committed to peace” (USAID 2002). To reduce the likelihood of conflict and
thus enhance a state’s security necessitates the conception of democratization
in terms of participatory mechanisms conducive to sustainable development.
Since it is only through inclusive participation that comprehensive ownership
of development can be ensured, donor agencies should strive to help the
various stakeholders identify common goals in terms of sustainable equitable
development for all. In so doing, donor agencies would have the leverage to
help overcome existing societal divisions, which, if not reconciled through
constructive consensus building (or at least compromise), could lead to an
escalation of violent conflicts.
The pursuit of development policies agreed upon by all major stakeholders can
trigger a process, which would, in the long run, strengthen the legitimacy of
governments and promote democratic consolidation that would spur the
transition from “instrumental” to “principled” commitments to the democratic
framework. Democratic consolidation cannot be thought of as completed unless
democracy becomes recognized as embodying a set of commonly shared values that
permit the adjudication of social and political differences through
negotiation and compromise rather than as a mere instrument to advance
different stakeholders’ interests. Liberal democracy comes as a by-product of
participatory development.
Yet, this analysis would not be complete without addressing the role of
development aid organizations as such. It is one thing to understand the
interdependence of security, development and democracy; it is another to
devise formulas, mechanisms and policies reflecting these understandings. This
becomes particularly obvious (and important) when we take into consideration
that each individual donor may have its own mission, its own objectives, its
own idiosyncrasies, and therefore its own approaches to development and
democratization.
In some instances, multiple donor agencies simultaneously operating in a given
country and pursuing different development strategies aimed at achieving
divergent objectives, be they economic liberalization, democratization or
peacebuilding, have often reduced the effectiveness of development programs,
and in some instances even contributed to worsening of the situation.
Desperate for cash, Third World states would promise anything to Northern
donors. Conditionalities attached to structural adjustment programs would make
it impossible for Third World states to determine where to allocate resources
most effectively, and as a result, neither economic nor political
liberalization would be accomplished. In certain instances and as some have
argued, the lack of coordination among donors in their pursuit of policies
with contradictory objectives led to violent conflicts in Rwanda or Burundi
(Andersen 2000; Liao 2002, Muscat 2002).
Thus far, this essay has delineated the role of development aid organizations
and highlights the linkages of aid to the underlying structural dimensions of
conflict, emerging conflicts or post-conflict recovery. In particular, I
focused on “democracy aid” as a type of development aid specifically designed
to promote democracy in the Third World. If the previous sections indicated
that development aid and foreign assistance in general have often been subject
to many controversies in relation to structural adjustment programs, the very
idea of deploying foreign assistance as a tool to promote democracy in the
Third World must necessarily be deemed even more contentious. Criticisms could
range from charges of intervening in the domestic affairs of Third World
states to outright accusations of Western imperialism. Democratization
policies pursued by bilateral development agencies have all too often focused
on institutional structures, improving and monitoring elections, strengthening
the rule of law, and working to curb corruption, but have in many instances
failed to recognize that democracy does not necessarily emerge just because
there are appropriate institutions and mechanisms in place.
As I mentioned earlier, democratically elected regimes in many parts of the
world continue to abuse their power, violate citizens’ rights, limit the
activity of political parties, civil society actors, and routinely reduce
democratic politics to regular but often flawed elections. Although some would
argue that democracy does not emerge overnight, development aid agencies may
need to rethink their approaches to democratization efforts and identify the
root causes of problems essentially preventing many Third World countries from
completing the process of democratic consolidation. “Democracy aid,” as Thomas
Carothers points out “must proceed from a penetrating analysis of the
particular core syndrome that defines the political life of the country in
question and how interventions can change that syndrome” (Carothers 2002).
This suggests a greater need for information sharing, coordination and
eventually harmonization of donor activities everywhere.
PART II
Development for Democracy: Case
Study of Uganda
There are several reasons to justify the choice of Uganda as a case study to
support the propositions advanced in this essay. Uganda’s economic development
and democratization is constrained in ways that have prevented the emergence
of pluralist democracies in many other Third World countries; yet, the
prospect for successful completion of the democratization process in Uganda
appears to be much brighter than in many other parts of the world currently
undergoing transition. The presence of large contingent of donors, which
assumed the responsibility of financing approximately 52% of Uganda’s GDP,
plays an important role and leverage in pushing for a smooth transition
towards a multi-party democracy.
Major human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch and Save the Children continuously report on the human rights situation
and consequently keep the government accountable for its actions
internationally. The civil society sector and media in Uganda are becoming
stronger, more independent and ever more politically vocal.
Uganda achieved its independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. As a result
of ethnic and religious divides, Uganda suffered 15 years of dictatorial
regimes, guerrilla wars and human rights abuses under the rule of Idi Amin
(1971-1979) and Milton Obote (1980-1985). The ongoing violent conflict in the
north of the country represents an unresolved legacy of the rules of Idi Amin
and Milton Obote. In general, it is possible to speak of a north-south divide,
which divides the country along political, economic and ethnic lines. The
north is historically the poorest in the country and is subject to high levels
of food scarcity, increased mortality rates, and lack of access to health and
education facilities (Lucy 2000). The lack of equitable development across the
country has brought about tremendous disparities in wealth and power between
the two regions. This economic and political marginalization has fueled the
violent conflict and effectively prevented a peaceful resolution and
long-lasting improvements in economic, human and social development (Lucy
2000).
During the 1990s, the government promulgated no-party presidential and
legislative elections. The no-party system was designed to prevent the
formation and ascendance of ethnic or religious-based political parties, which
could spur new conflicts over the years. The government has, at least in its
rhetoric, progressively expressed more serious commitment to democratic
practices, although recent trends may indicate a slight reversal. However, as
time has passed, it has become increasingly obvious that the government did
not intend to move beyond the no-party system and progressively introduce
elements of pluralist democratic mechanisms. A referendum on the future of the
no-party presidential and legislative system is scheduled for 2004, and new
elections for 2006. The country’s security continues to be undermined by
ongoing conflicts in the north and generally in the Great Lakes region, which
transcends the boundaries of Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, and Uganda (The CIA World Factbook 2003). This is despite UN
peacekeeping efforts and Uganda’s government officials’ pledges to end the
conflict. As part of the reconciliation process in the North of the country,
Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s incumbent president, attempted to incorporate other
groups into the ruling National Resistance Movement, which brought some degree
of stability. However, mistreatment of the Acholi people in the North and the
rejection of a multi-party democracy have forced many opponents to withdraw to
the North and continue their activities against the government there. These
developments combined with the ongoing war in Sudan, the government’s support
of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the south of Sudan and the
aligning of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the North of Uganda with the Islamic
government in the North of Sudan further complicated the efforts to restore
peace and stability in the region.
A recent study on “Prevention of Violent Conflict and the Coherence of EU
Policies towards the Horn of Africa” issued by the InterAfrica Group points to
some additional risks of conflict in the North of Uganda. The inability of the
Ugandan government and the international donor community in Uganda to put an
end to the conflict stems from continued lack of access to political and
military power by the Acholi opposition in the North, oppression of the Acholi
people by the National Resistance Army/National Resistance Movement, lack of
trust between the Acholi population and the government of Uganda,
destabilizing inter-state tensions, economic instability and widespread
poverty, destruction of social and economic infrastructure, and the breakdown
of the community, family and cultural values (InterAfrica Group 2000).
Uganda is one of the poorest countries in the world with 35 percent of the
population still living below the poverty line (NORAD 2003). Similarly like
many other developing economies, the vast majority of Uganda’s population
(80-84 per cent) continues to rely on agricultural production, with coffee
accounting for the bulk of export revenues (The CIA World Factbook 2003; NORAD
2003). This has made it particularly vulnerable to fluctuations of prices on
primary commodity markets. As a result, the government is weak and foreign aid
continues to represent a key source of revenue that permits the government to
perform and deliver basic services.
Thus, three fundamental sources of potential violent conflict in Uganda can be
identified. First, unless peace is restored in the North of the country, there
is an ongoing possibility of the conflict spilling over to the rest of the
country. Second, economic underdevelopment may fuel social tensions and
violence. Third, unless the government moves towards a multi-party democracy,
the increasing discontent of the opposition both in the South and in the North
may translate directly into violence targeting the government and its
supporters. In line with the argument developed in this essay, any policy
aimed at conflict resolution or conflict prevention promulgated by the
international development community in Uganda will need to ensure full and
meaningful participation of all stakeholder groups in the development process.
Donors have embarked upon a promising path towards pluralist democracy in
Uganda, but have largely failed to bring about positive outcomes in the North.
Given the above analysis, unless the North is fully integrated into the
democratization process, the likelihood of violent conflict spilling from the
North to the rest of the country will remain.
Reasons
for Hope, Reasons for Fear
The Poverty Eradication Action Plan Reflects a
High Degree of National Ownership
The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is Uganda’s comprehensive
Development Framework, which has guided the formulation of government policy
since its inception in 1997 and reflects a high degree of national ownership.
It incorporates visions, issues and measures from the whole spectrum of
society and lists sound priorities and objectives for the country’s
development strategy. Under this plan, Uganda is being transformed into a
modern economy in which agents in all sectors can participate in economic
growth.
The strategy sets out three key conditions: (1) The economy requires
structural transformation, including the modernization of agriculture and the
development of industries which build on demand and supply linkages from
agriculture, (2) the poor must be able to participate in this growth, both by
expanding smallholder agriculture and by expanding employment in industry and
services, as well as in rural non farm enterprises, and (3) economic growth
must be sustainable (Republic of Uganda: Ministry of Finance Planning and
Economic Development 2003).
By integrating the four pillars of the PEAP—sustainable economic growth and
structural transformation, good governance and security, increased ability of
the poor to raise their incomes, and increased quality of the life of the
poor—the Government of Uganda has been able to develop policies, which address
key problems of the country’s economic development, but simultaneously
succeeded in improving its legitimacy as a government that implements
policies, which reflect broad public opinion.
What is particularly interesting is that the PEAP was created two years before
the World Bank endorsed the proposals that Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
should be prepared by national authorities, in close collaboration with its
staff. Subsequently, Uganda became one of the pilot countries testing the new
approach to the World Bank’s activities in the field of poverty reduction in
the Third World. While Uganda experienced strong economic growth throughout
the 1990s, high prices for oil, long-term droughts, a ban on fish exports to
the EU (recently revoked) and problems in the banking and financial sectors
brought about decline in growth. The government also continues to be unable to
collect substantial amounts of taxes, which accounted for only 11.5 percent of
GDP in 2000-2001 (NORAD 2003).
PEAP and Civil Society
While the involvement of civil society in the design of the PEAP was not
necessarily political in nature, the substantial growth of the civil society
sector as well as improvements in respect for human rights (namely freedom of
speech) accompanied the overall political and economic transition in its
earlier stages. Equally, private businesses and associations have emerged as a
result of both political and economic liberalization. This would be highly
unlikely if the country’s legal system did not provide adequate guarantees of
private property protection and respect for basic civil and political rights.
Contrary to my earlier assertion that the dual processes of economic and
political liberalization can in fact lead to renewed conflicts, the Ugandan
case illustrates that participatory development mechanisms, in the context of
economic liberalization, can further enhance the process of political
liberalization. Government’s positive steps to give citizens greater political
and economic freedoms eventually weaken the state’s control over information
and the opposition (RESPOND Uganda 2002).
Bearing in mind that President Museweni is currently serving his last term,
the upcoming referendum on political reform to be held in 2004 may in fact
ensure pluralist democratic elections in Uganda in 2006. As some of the most
outspoken opposition leaders claim, the failure of the government to move
towards pluralist democracy by 2006 will likely leave it with no other option
but to employ repressive measures to curb political dissent from individuals
and groups advocating for multi-party elections (RESPOND Uganda 2002). In
other words, a pro-democratic sentiment appears to be maturing despite the
government’s reluctance to reform. As the opposition grows and matures, and
exerts increasing pressure on the government, which has only two options from
which to choose. The government either has to allow more freedom and
democratic pluralism or resort to blatant coercion and repressive measures.
While the former may result in its replacement, the latter could lead to
serious repercussions in terms of lesser support from the international donor
community, which would inevitably weaken the government’s position to
effectively retain power anyway. At the same time, however, despite criticisms
from the opposition concerning the incumbent president’s commitment to
multi-party democracy, Yoweri Museveni enjoys a rather considerable amount of
popular support outside of Kampala, Uganda’s capital. Should the no-party
system be transformed into a multi-party system, the Movement is likely to
emerge as one of the strongest parties, which could continue dominating
Uganda’s politics even under the new system.
A Critical Point
The 2003 Human Rights Watch World Report attests to this tendency by noting
that political and civil rights were violated in Uganda owing to continued
conflict over the no-party system (Human Rights Watch 2003). The highly
contested Political Organizations Law, which outlaws most activities normally
associated with political parties, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Act, which
broadly defines terrorism as the “use of violence or threat of violence with
intent to promote or achieve political, religious, economic and cultural or
social ends in an unlawful manner” both illustrate the recent reversals in the
democratization process.
These developments should serve as a warning to the international donor
community currently present in Uganda. Unless donors make it explicitly clear
that political deliberalization in Uganda would engender diminished support on
their part, the government may have little to fear.
Donor Democracy Governance Group
The international donor community in Uganda is particularly well positioned to
do so. In July 2002, governments of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Commission and the
United Nations Development Programme represented by their official
representatives accredited to Uganda established the formal/informal Donor
Democracy Governance Group (DDGG). DDGG’s main objective is to harmonize donor
activities aimed at deepening democracy, facilitating the transition towards
greater political pluralism in the period leading up to and during the 2006
elections, and promoting human rights and governance. As such, DDGG is a
pioneering effort to establish a consensus on the part of the donor community
on issues concerning the types of activities that should be supported, mode of
interaction with the recipient government and major stakeholder groups, as
well as reporting, consultation and liaison among donors.
Having agreed on key principles, the donor community can act as a single
entity vis-à-vis the Government of Uganda (GoU). In turn, the GoU must take
into consideration the potential impacts that its decisions might have on the
donors’ perception of the extent to which its commitment to economic and
political reform is truly genuine within the PEAP framework. Should the DDGG
conclude that the Republic of Uganda is on a seriously wrong track moving away
from its stated intentions, support for the government itself may be
withdrawn, while it may be substantially increased for those actors working to
promote democratic pluralism on the ground.
Unfortunately, such unanimity among donors may be hard to achieve even in
Uganda due to divisions over the most effective strategies to resolve the
conflict in the North. Although member governments of DDGG have agreed on key
principles pertaining to good governance, rule of law and democracy, it is not
so easy to arrive at a consensus when it comes to matters of international and
regional security. While the European Union and a number of other donors have
adopted a comprehensive strategy aimed at conflict prevention in Uganda
primarily through demobilization and reintegration programs of combatants, the
governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have shown a growing
willingness to support the incumbent Ugandan president’s efforts to help the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) fight a guerrilla war against the
Islamic government in neighboring Sudan in an attempt to stop the spread of
Islam southwards. The Sudanese government, in response, has supported the
Lord’s Resistance Army fighting a guerrilla war fought in the north of Uganda.
Indeed, should the peace process in Sudan conclude successfully, SPLA would
have no need to seek external military support, and the donor community in
Uganda would be more likely to act in concert in regards to the ongoing
conflict in the north of the country. However, unless the conflict is
resolved, and given the rather significant Muslim minority living in Uganda,
such a conflict might further worsen tensions between Uganda’s Christians and
Muslims. If indeed these religious differences become exploited by leaders
during multi-party democratic elections, it may take more than just monitoring
efforts on the part of the international community to ensure peace and
stability are maintained. These interlocking conflicts involve regional,
economic and identity dimensions and the introduction of pluralist democratic
practices might and likely will not result in ending of the conflict. Such
regional conflicts, indeed, make the job of democratizing Uganda much more
difficult.
Concluding Remarks
Given the past history of bilateral donors’ engagement in Third World
development and democratization processes, it may be in fact incorrect to
assume that developed countries both want to and understand how to help. As I
have argued earlier, the history of foreign assistance in the post-Cold War
era has shown time and again that developed countries are either unwilling or
unable to do what needs to be done to facilitate the transition towards
democracy and sustainable development in developing countries. The story in a
nutshell is that the international donor community has had an unprecedented
historic opportunity to make the world a safer, more just, more democratic
place, and yet, the impacts of its development efforts in the Third World
cannot be ascertained in a universally applicable manner.
“Democracy aid” is necessary, but so is “Development aid”. On its own,
“democracy aid” will be insufficient. However, there is a need for greater
coherence and consistency on the part of developed countries and their
development agencies to face issues relating to fair trade (i.e. reducing
tariff barriers to trade, decreasing subsidies to their own industries), debt
alleviation, and engaging in constructing sufficient security for all, as
opposed to building up a fortress around themselves and using foreign
assistance to maintain the status quo. Unless these macro issues are addressed
in a consistent manner, democracy aid and development assistance through
bilateral aid will not deliver any substantial results. Occasional success
stories should not divert our attention from the larger problems that still
need to be addressed.
In many ways, Uganda indeed serves as a good example to illustrate the
potential of harmonization of bilateral donor activities in development and
democratization processes. The DDGG has the resources, expertise and the
leverage necessary to help Uganda get on the right track. At the same time,
however, it also highlights its limitations. Depending on the outcome of the
2004 referendum and the 2006 elections, Uganda might become a truly pluralist
democracy without having attained high levels of industrialization. In this
sense, the proposition that genuine democracy is a mere luxury of developed
industrialized nations would be invalidated. Simultaneously, Uganda can only
reach a certain point without substantial economic growth driving its
development and further democratic consolidation. Considering the unequal
terms of trade and the lack of political and economic leverage of Third World
countries in general, it is quite unlikely that we can observe truly
sustainable development supporting global trends towards democratization in
the long run. What is needed is consistence and coherence of global efforts at
attaining the objectives of sustainable development and democratization.
Furthermore, the success of democratic consolidation will indeed depend on the
extent to which international donors are genuinely committed to the promotion
of pluralist democracy. If, indeed, it is the case that international donors
come to perceive regional security and stability as requiring the use of
military force and sacrificing democratization efforts, then the likelihood of
violent conflict will remain in the longer run, as marginalized groups seek
ways to protect their particular interests. In short, violence in the Third
World is unlikely to bring about peace and stability.
PART III
Conclusion
Given the complexity of conflicts plaguing Third World countries today, it is
hard to come up with a universally applicable conclusion or a ‘cookie-cutter’
kind of a recipe for conflict prevention. Rather, the results of any study
attempting to suggest ways to resolve or prevent conflicts are likely to
remain inconclusive unless the general prescriptions are appropriately
contextualized. A few general comments can, however, be made regarding the
roles that development and democratization efforts can play in conflict
prevention.
My argument is founded on two fundamental observations. First, pluralist
democratic regimes are most capable of reconciling societal differences
through non-violent means. Second, given the destabilizing effects of economic
liberalization in the Third World context, no political regime can maintain
peace unless it adopts participatory development mechanisms through which to
integrate all stakeholder groups. As long as any social group remains left out
of formal decision-making processes, growing discontent and marginalization
will likely fuel societal conflict outside of boundaries of formal politics.
In this sense, the no-party system in Uganda certainly fails to meet the most
fundamental criteria of democratic politics.
The international development community has a particularly important role to
play in democratization processes in the Third World. Donors can act as
effective catalysts of positive change bringing both expertise and financial
resources required to support democratization and development efforts. They
have the leverage necessary to force governments in the Third World to pursue
policies that strengthen their legitimacy, accountability and that bring peace
and prosperity to peoples, who have, to date, been largely left out from
enjoying the benefits that economic globalization produces.
The following should constitute the central tenets of any policy for conflict
prevention pursued by bilateral donor agencies. First, conditionality in aid
programs and trade agreements is necessary. Bilateral donor agencies need to
contribute, by imposing conditionalities through their programs, to attaining
the objective of developing and consolidating democracy, rule of law, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This can be done by requiring
nation-wide consultations on national development priorities and strategies to
involve all stakeholder groups in the process. Second, partnerships must be
suspended in particularly grave cases of non-compliance with the terms of the
partnership between bilateral donor agencies and the recipient state. Third,
bi-lateral donor agencies must coordinate their efforts in any given context
and utilize every single opportunity to condemn with one voice any failure of
a recipient state to fulfill the requirements and conditionalities of the
specific partnership. The lack of consensus within the donor community on the
particular strategies that need to be pursued in particular contexts will only
undermine the development towards democratic consolidation. Given the
important role that bilateral development agencies play in many Third World
states today as guarantors of economic and political stability, it may be
necessary in particularly serious circumstances to utilize hard power, in the
form of embargos, sanctions and the use of military force, to coerce Third
World states into compliance. In the past, many donors have utilized ‘carrots’
to provide incentives for positive action to be taken by individual
governments, but in many instances, they failed to threaten using the ‘stick’
to bring about a genuine commitment to democratic reform. The threat of the
use of force may sometimes be the only way to ensure foreign aid reaches those
in the direst need and brings about the kind of change that is necessary to
prevent conflict in the Third World today.
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For a review of literature on the democratic peace thesis, see Chan (1997)
For more information on the “institutionalist” approaches to conflict
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approach perspective, see Hamburg (2002)
A territorially consolidated state, with a government exercising effective
monopoly on the use of violence and enjoying unconditional legitimacy in
the eyes of its citizens, is a prerequisite for any modern democracy to
exist. The process of state-making must be accompanied by improvements in
both internal and external security, which in turn requires resources that
can be generated through development or obtained from the international
donor community. These resources are required in the long term as well,
which is why it is imperative that development is sustainable. Policies
aimed at achieving sustainable development must take into consideration
social, economic and environmental factors. These three dimensions of
sustainable development are interdependent and must be further informed by
cultural particularities and political aspirations of all major
stakeholder groups. To neglect the social dimension of sustainable
development may result in growing socio-economic inequalities and an
ultimate failure to eradicate poverty. To ignore environmental concerns in
any policy aimed at achieving sustainable development may lead to
environmental degradation and the erosion of the natural resource base
upon which the economy is founded. Finally, economic policies that fail to
deliver economic growth may impede the process of development.
By integrating cultural and
political factors, we can conclude that to achieve sustainable
development, any policy must be grounded in a political consensus (or at
least a compromise), which takes into consideration any cultural,
political, religious or ideological differences within a given society.
Any policy, which fails to do so, will lack the support and legitimacy
necessary for the achievement of sustainable development and risks
alienating excluded groups to an extent where violence may be perceived as
the only remaining option. This is particularly true in scenarios where
basic needs of excluded groups are not met or where perception is formed
of relative poverty, deprivation or inequality of opportunity as resulting
from a particular policy pursued by the central government.
The Memorandum of Understanding explicitly outlines the specific
interventions of donors in the recipient country: (1) Civil society
monitoring of the democratic process at play in Uganda and of the
transition to greater political pluralism; (2) Constitutional and legal
reform processes; (3) The embedding of the NEPAD process as it relates to
the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative; (4) Good governance as
appropriate within the framework of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan,
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Poverty Reduction Support
Credit; (5) Human Rights Monitoring; (6) The efforts of civil society and
state structures to combat corruption and promote transparent and ethical
governance, and (7) The continuous and comprehensive civic education on
civil, political, economic and social rights.