Financing Sustainable Development
& New Compact for Development: A New
Approach to U.S. Overseas Development Assistance
By Jan Kozak, May
2003, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, United States
President Bush's recently
proposed “New Compact for Development” would increase U.S. development
assistance by 50 percent by fiscal year 2006, adding $5,000 million to U.S.
annual official aid flows, according to a March 22 White House fact sheet.
What is the New Compact for Development? What
role does overseas development assistance play in the New Compact? What are
the conditions under which this assistance is delivered? And is $5,000 million
enough?
Global economic integration
today is characterized by rapid advances in international trade, investment,
productive efficiency, competitiveness, migration, progress in information
technology, weakening of individual nation-states’ legitimacy, but also by
progressive codification of international law, and synchronization of
production standards and consumption patterns. Never in the history of human
kind have countries all over the world been integrated and interdependent to
such an extent as they are today. It is unquestionable that this process
generated unprecedented wealth and helped lift millions out of poverty. Yet,
simultaneously, the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st
century has been marked by radical backlashes against globalization. The
benefits of globalization have not necessarily been shared equally by all the
countries and people in the world, and widened the gap between the rich and
the poor. Voices of dissent, critical of the character of the contemporary
global political economy arrangements, call for alternatives.
The primary drivers of
conflict and human insecurity are socioeconomic divisions and environmental
constraints. While free-market mechanisms deliver economic growth, economic
justice issues are generally inadequately addressed. Environmental conflicts
over scarce resources, in particular when Western interests conflict with
local concerns, contribute to the growing discontent.
“For U.S. development policy
to achieve maximum effectiveness, it should develop an integrated approach
toward meritorious countries, combining aid with the powerful tools of trade,
investment cooperation, and debt relief.”
Although the configuration of the items on the list may appear to differ from
previous US overseas development strategies, I argue that the fundamental
principles and assumptions remain unchanged. As history has shown, the
perception that economic growth inevitably leads to poverty reduction is
erroneous. Yet, the combination of “aid, trade, investment cooperation and
debt relief” appears to aim precisely for nothing but delivering higher rates
of economic growth. Any long-term strategy aimed at addressing the underlying
issues must include a fundamental revision of Western beliefs and priorities.
This will involve measures to adequately address the debt crisis, promote
freer and fairer trade globally, advance economic cooperation, promote
sustainable environmental management, emphasize the need for the integration
of concerns for economic, social and environmental justice as well as ethical
considerations. A new approach to overseas development aid must aim to address
the root causes of poverty, human insecurity and environmental degradation by
working towards creating and sustaining societies that enable individual human
beings to realize their full potential.
The UN Millenium Development
Goals
identified by the international community during the UN Millenium Summit in
New York, USA, in September 2000, point to the issues, which need to be
addressed in order to lift underdeveloped countries out of poverty and launch
them on a way to sustainable development. Such strategies can be devised and
implemented by individual governments, the United Nations, as well as by
multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization and the International Monetary Fund. Some reforms of these
institutions may be needed to better serve the objectives of development
strategies in the 21st century. The collaborative efforts of the
United States and the European Union will be central to promoting and
attaining such objectives.
In this essay, I evaluate
the past and present approaches to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) by
the United States (US) government. First, I provide a brief overview of the
evolution of the concept of ODA since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
Second, I examine the premises and assumptions made in devising the US ODA
strategy. Third, I provide an analysis of the impacts and implications of such
a strategy on the developing world. Lastly, I draw conclusions and
recommendations for how this strategy could be altered to assure that the
desired outcomes are attained.
The Evolution of the Overseas
Development Aid Concept
It is easier and more common to discuss the
concept of sustainable development than to discuss its financing. And it is
certainly not too often that we can discuss something that is even more
complicated than the concept of sustainable development itself. To date, the
discussion on finance for sustainable development has very much centered on
the discussion of Overseas Development Aid (ODA). However, this should not
become the end of the discussion. Financial resources are a crucial element
for the implementation of Agenda 21, the official program of action adopted by
the vast majority of the world’s governments present at the Rio de Janeiro
Earth Summit in 1992. Chapter 33 of Agenda 21 dealing specifically with the
Means of Implementation recognizes ODA as the main source of external
financing for developing countries as reaffirmed by the United Nations target
of increasing ODA to 0.7 percent of donor countries’ Gross National Product
(GNP).
Agenda 21 also recognizes the importance of debt relief for the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). It explicitly states that “All creditors in
the Paris Club should promptly implement the agreement of December 1991 to
provide debt relief for the poorest heavily indebted countries pursuing
structural adjustment.”
In addition, it is recognized that ultimately, the main source of financing
sustainable development of a country must come from its own private and public
sectors. In turn, Agenda 21 stresses the importance of policy reforms,
economic restructuring, and innovative financing mechanisms.
Resources from ODA have actually declined to 0.22
percent of donor countries’ GNP in 2000.
As regards the debt situation, the result has been somewhat mixed with
significant progress achieved in the reduction of debt burden of middle income
countries through improved economic policies, export performance, debt
rescheduling, and new financial instruments. By contrast, the debt burden of
low-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has remained unchanged
or increased, despite the HIPC initiatives and some success in reducing
bilateral debt, partly because of poor export performance.
The most positive outcome since Rio in external
financing to developing countries has been the rise in private capital flows,
which more than doubled. However, private capital flows cannot substitute for
ODA because the poorest countries that need it most receive the least, as
investors are reluctant to invest into politically and economically unstable
economies.
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), an
international environmental fund, represents yet another success on the
international scene, as it succeeded in transferring some resources from the
North to the South. A 2001 evaluation report concludes that “GEF-supported
projects have been able to produce significant results aimed at improving
global environmental problems.”
However, a number of problems have been identified that still require our
attention, namely the participation of major stakeholder groups in the design
and implementation of GEF projects, as well as general awareness of GEF.
International taxation on international financial
flows presents yet another opportunity for the international community to be
explored as it could potentially generate resources to finance sustainable
development in the developing world. However, as individual countries are
witnessing increasing nationalism against the background of powerful forces of
market-based globalization, it may not be too useful to introduce
supranational approaches such as international taxes in whatever form in this
situation.
Although there has been some progress in reducing
environmentally damaging subsidies on energy, water, agro-chemicals and land
clearing, a large number of countries particularly in the North, continue to
use agricultural subsidies as a way of making competition more difficult for
producers in developing countries to be able to sell their products in the
North.
Human insecurity driven by poverty, lack of
legitimate governing structures and disrespect for human rights is
destabilizing and creates conditions under which individuals and groups of
people can resort to the most radical actions, including terrorism, to regain
control over their lives. Recognizing the shortcomings of the contemporary
neoliberal economic order and adopting adjusted models of economic development
is central to the restoration of trust among those on the margins of societies
and subsequently to promoting state and human security as well as the general
objectives of reducing poverty world-wide. These adjusted models must
integrate the principles of country ownership, responsibility of developing
countries for good governance, accountability, and policy reforms to address
economic, environmental and social justice issues. Developed countries have
reciprocal obligations in terms of policy and financial support.
Pro-poor economic growth is a prerequisite and
simultaneously a key solution to poverty alleviation. Pro-poor economic growth
also necessarily implies the need for the redistribution of the gains
generated by economic growth. In a traditional market-based approach, such
pro-poor economic growth would be considered as a fallacy. In order to
reconcile this problem, and attain growth in the first place, ODA should be
seen as the primary tool in facilitating economic growth though progressively,
ODA should be substituted with alternative sources of financing development,
such as domestic savings, export earnings and foreign investment, in order not
to encourage long-term dependence on ODA. “Growth will depend on a
continuation of market-based policies which promote investment in the context
of low inflation and effective macro-economic management. For many
governments, this will mean continued commitment to programmes of economic
reform and market liberalisation.”
Actions needed to achieve pro-poor economic growth therefore have two levels:
(1) creating the macroeconomic conditions to encourage growth, and (2)
implementing measures to include, support or protect the poor. This implies
spending in social sectors such as health, education and infrastructure.
However, in the past, the latter objective has often proven to be
contradictory to the former, as governments wishing to attain pro-poor growth
were forced to increase public spending, thus being unable to meet the
objectives of effective fiscally-sound macro-economic management. Therefore,
the development community should not reduce its activity solely to delivering
ODA, but should also focus on (1) direct interventions to reduce the
vulnerability and protect the livelihoods of the poor and (2) consider
resource distribution, both of physical and social assets. This is based on
the analysis that inequality slows poverty reduction. Additionally, ODA
recipient countries should (3) adopt a rights-based approach for empowerment
and a redistribution of political power to ensure a broad public participation
and endorsement of any development initiative.
At the UN Conference on Financing for Development
(Monterey, Mexico, March 2002), the international donor community
reaffirmed its continued commitment to ODA, though reaching the target level
of 0.7% of GDP agreed upon in Agenda 21—one of the only concrete outcomes of
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992—was greatly debated. The US argued
that due to increased private donations and massive flows of US foreign direct
investment into developing countries, its commitment to meeting the 0.7%
target was no longer necessary. As I mentioned earlier in this essay, the
rhetorical commitment to ODA has never been matched in practice. The
overall ODA contribution of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members averages
at 0.40% in 2001.
“US aid rose by 11.6 per cent last year but equaled only 0.12
per cent of national income.”
The UN and the World Bank estimate
that “rich countries would need to double the over $50,000 million they spend
annually on development to achieve these international development goals.”
ODA is an integral element of the global action
plan aimed at accomplishing the Millenium Development Goals. Centralized
multilateral approach to delivering ODA would be preferable so as to avoid
duplicity and increase overall ODA effectiveness. Monitoring mechanisms should
be established through which to assess the effectiveness of the particular
development strategies implemented in the recipient countries. Additionally,
ODA delivered via multilateral channels would be less suspect to donors’
interests, which could further strengthen trust and promote a truly genuine
dialogue between the donors and recipients.
As was noted in a recent internal report of the OECD, “Most big official aid
donors have fulfilled pledges to “untie” areas of official development
assistance but have been slow to disclose in advance offers of untied aid for
specific projects in the world's poorest countries.”
The importance of relegating the implementation of development projects to
local suppliers in recipient countries has been increasingly viewed as one of
the key prerequisites for success, as it would have important implications
both for country ownership as well as it would further foster employment and
economic growth in the recipient country. OECD therefore urged all of its
members to “untie” their development projects and end requirements that assist
those to be carried out by suppliers in donor countries. The same report
however notes that the US has failed nearly entirely in complying with such
OECD recommendations.
The objectives of ODA are to (1) progressively
contribute to empowering individuals to actively participate in the developing
country’s economic life and (2) to alleviate absolute poverty. ODA should be
delivered in two phases, which can but do not necessarily have to go hand in
hand. It is important to realize, however, that each phase has a distinct set
of objectives. The objective of the first phase should be to create the
macroeconomic conditions necessary to encourage economic growth. This implies
channeling resources to infrastructure, and measures to increase the
efficiency of the recipient country’s export sector and developing new areas
of the country’s comparative advantage. Inevitably, however, economic growth
will lead to greater economic disparities within the developing country. Both
increasing taxation and/or reducing public spending would effectively lead to
a reinforcement of the adverse effects of economic growth. Thus, the second
phase of ODA deliverance should assume the responsibility of what was
previously thought to be the responsibility of the developing country’s
government: (1) interventions to reduce the vulnerability and protect the
livelihoods of the poor and (2) resource distribution, both of physical and
social assets (based on the analysis that inequality slows poverty reduction).
As levels of absolute poverty decline and as economic growth generates more
resources, governments in developing countries will progressively assume their
responsibility for resource distribution and the second phase of ODA can be,
over time, reduced.
To conclude, for developing countries, ODA should
remain a major source of external funding. This requires intensified efforts
to reverse the downward trend of ODA. Relating mainly to the end of the Cold
War and to the predominance of market-based globalization forces, both of
which require considerable readjustments in political and economic
arrangements in practically all countries, including donor countries,
reversing the recent declining trend of ODA should be attempted mainly from a
politico-economic perspective. Putting ODA into the new reality of the
political economy of the international community should be the priority
concern. Simultaneously, all countries should address the underlying causes of
this trend. Second, private domestic and foreign capital should continue to be
seen as a major tool of economic development, which requires governments to
ensure a stable macro-economic environment, open trade and investment
policies, and well-functioning legal and financial systems.
The US and OD
The US government’s traditional ODA programs in
the past have been often distorted by foreign policy considerations. Instead
of defining objective criteria for developing countries to qualify for US ODA,
resources have been channeled to US allies rather than to countries committed
to fighting poverty. For instance in 2000, out of a total of nearly ten
billion dollars, $1.15 billion went to Russia, $0.97 billion to Israel and
$0.8 billion to Egypt.
On March 30, 2003, President George W. Bush “guaranteed Israel about $2
billion in military aid and another $1 billion in economic assistance”
as a part of a US aid package to friends and allies in the Middle East to deal
with the adverse impacts of the war in Iraq. “More often than not, development
policy and foreign policy have pulled U.S. foreign assistance programs in two
different directions.”
"Much of US aid in the past
has not been based on performance but rather on assessed needs as well as on
the political and economic objectives of the United States.”
The objectives of US foreign policy and development assistance have varied
substantially in the past, yet it seemed to be a common belief at USAID that
both could be pursued simultaneously. At times, assistance has been provided
to “maintain goodwill or provide a political reward deemed vital to US
interests.”
At other times, such assistance would be used to “secure cooperation on a
particular activity” (i.e. war against narcotics) or to “help maintain the
economic stability of a country that serves as a critical regional anchor
whose instability could have ripple effects throughout the region.”
However, it has been more difficult to separate official US foreign policy
activities from pure development assistance, which should be allocated on the
basis of an analysis of a combination of need and local policy environment.
The New Compact for Development proposed
by President George W. Bush on March 22, 2002, aims to address precisely those
concerns by creating a bilateral development fund, also known as the Millenium
Challenge Account (MCA). The Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an
independent agency of the USAID, will be charged with the administration of
the MCA to allocate the new funding based on objective selection criteria
measuring a nation’s commitment to “governing justly, investing in people, and
encouraging economic freedom,”
and thus, according to their ability to reduce poverty. The reasoning behind
the insistence of the US government on good domestic governance and sound
policies is perhaps a little oversimplified. “The New Compact recognizes that…
in sound policy environments, aid attracts private investment… in countries
where poor public policy dominates, aid can actually harm the very citizens it
was meant to help.”
Although such a correlation may be true, one could argue that developing sound
policies and promoting good domestic governance should perhaps also be one of
the key objectives of any ODA strategy.
It is argued that the MCA brings with it
the opportunity to improve significantly the allocation and delivery of US
foreign assistance, as it will differ from existing programs in four critical
ways. First, it will have narrower and more clearly defined objectives, aimed
solely at supporting economic growth and development and not other foreign
policy goals. Second, it will provide assistance to only a select group of
low-income countries that are implementing sound development policies, making
the aid funds sent to those countries more effective. Third, the
administration hopes that the MCA will have lower bureaucratic and
administrative costs than current aid programs. Fourth, the administration
plans to give recipient countries a greater say in program design,
implementation, and evaluation to improve program efficiency and
effectiveness.
The MCA certainly represents a major
change in the way the US provides development assistance. All countries with
average per capita incomes below $1,435 will be eligible. However, the point
is to select a relatively small number of countries, based on their
demonstrated commitment to sound policies and good governance, provide them
with large sums of money, give them more say in designing aid-funded programs,
and hold them accountable for achieving results. “Sixteen countries are on the
initial list to be evaluated after Congress approves the programme in coming
months, said Patrick Cronin, assistant administrator at the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).”
If implemented carefully and effectively, the MCA could fundamentally improve
US development assistance. Its success is far from assured, however. Due to
the excessive attention that the Bush administration currently pays to the War
on Terror, the administration does not seem to have made the MCA a
particularly high priority since the President announced the program more than
one year ago.
Although the current rhetoric of the
Bush administration appears to make complete sense, we could conclude that the
criteria for eligibility for US funds really limit the number of countries
eligible, and thus failed states and those in the direst need of assistance
will once again be left behind. After all, it is in authoritarian states run
by ruthless dictators disrespectful of even the most basic human rights, where
people suffer the most. The positive correlation between good domestic
governance and the effectiveness of ODA has been demonstrated in many research
efforts and serves as the foundational building block for the MCA eligibility
requirements. However, according to a recent report issued by the World Bank,
it may also be useful to examine the effects of increased income on the
quality of domestic governance. According to this report, “As countries become
richer, it is important not to exaggerate the conventional wisdom that higher
incomes lead to demands for better institutional quality.”
In other words, improvements in domestic governance and institutional quality
do not necessarily occur as a consequence of economic development. In the
absence of a positive feedback from increased incomes to better governance,
the virtuous circle from higher incomes to better institutions and in turn
leading to higher incomes cannot be launched. Even as GDP of a country rises
over time, it is not necessarily true that the benefits of such economic
growth are shared widely by the population at large. Individuals belonging to
governing elites benefiting from the status quo characterized by undemocratic
practices and disrespect for human rights can simply resist demands for change
even as incomes rise. It is simply not sure whether the MCA truly represents a
strong incentive for countries with bad policies to change their ways.
Dictators who are committed to nothing but enriching themselves at the expense
of those starving may see too few benefits in complying with US expectations.
My main concern, however, relates to the
administration’s ability to truly break away from its traditional thinking
about development assistance. As a recent proposal for US aid to states in the
Middle East submitted by George W. Bush illustrates, it may turn out more
difficult than one would hope. “President Bush's $75 billion funding request
to pay for the war with Iraq includes $12.4 billion in military and economic
aid and loan guarantees to Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel.”
It is unclear why in this instance such an amount of US aid should be
allocated to military and economic aid instead of to humanitarian aid.
Provided that approximately two thirds of the money allocated has to be spent
in the US for US defense contractors, the reasoning behind such a proposal
becomes a little more obvious. Ultimately, not only that such aid provides
extra security guarantees for the aforementioned states in the Middle East; it
also provides extra revenues for the Lockhead Martin and Northrop Grumman.
As the War on Terror progresses and even
civil liberties are circumscribed in the US itself, there seem to be few
reasons why US development assistance goals should be placed above national
security considerations and the framing of US foreign policy in the first
place. Indeed, both should go hand in hand – US foreign policy aiming at
creating a more secure world and US development assistance policy aiming for a
more prosperous and sustainable world. Untying aid is a prerequisite for the
success of US ODA. The Bush administration should also remove any onerous
conditions and reporting requirements placed on recipient countries – after
all, countries which meet the eligibility criteria in the first place should
know best how to use such aid responsibly.
ODA and Fair Trade
It is important to bear in mind that the
above recommendations, still grounded in the pro-growth pro-export oriented
development strategy, are made on the assumption that developing countries can
profit from their comparative advantages by having the capacity to access
foreign markets. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade present a major
obstacle to rendering ODA truly effective. While developing countries continue
opening up their markets, driven by the incentive that such measures will
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and effectively replace the need for
ODA, the developed countries, and specifically the EU and the US, have failed
entirely to comply with Article 2, 3, 13 and 14 of the Doha Declaration[i]
and thus reduce their subsidies particularly to the agricultural and textile
industries.
The continued protectionism in the developed countries is also in direct
contradiction with their commitment to enhanced cooperation with the Bretton
Woods institutions for greater coherence in global economic policy making, as
articulated in Article 5 of the same declaration.[ii]
Conclusion
Global economic integration has led to unprecedented levels of wealth and
prosperity, but also contributed to growing economic disparities within and
between countries and increasing numbers of people living in absolute poverty.
Economic growth continues to be seen as the prerequisite and the key solution
to alleviating poverty around the world. The economic model of development, as
referred to in the New Compact for Development, is based on reciprocal
obligations between the developed and the developing world. It must respect
the principles of country ownership, good governance and accountability. Based
on the New Compact, the US has the responsibility to provide policy and
financial support.
The New Compact for Development may increase the effectiveness of US ODA as it
sets out clear criteria for eligibility. However, this does not necessarily
mean that it will reach those in the direst need of help. Understanding that
the poorest countries including failed states with underdeveloped or
non-existent governing structures may simply not qualify, the risk is that
thousands if not millions of people will be left behind again. Perhaps, a more
useful approach could be to use US ODA to promote good domestic governance in
the first place, which, in turn, would indeed attract FDI anyway.
Given that US ODA in the past has been rarely separated from US foreign policy
objectives, it remains to be seen whether the MCC will truly adhere to the
eligibility criteria for countries to qualify for US ODA. The recent history
in particular certainly provides justifications for concern. The Bush
administration may turn out to be more concerned about fighting terrorism than
poverty in the developing world.
Pro-poor economic growth is a fallacy in a market-based approach to
development founded upon a continuation of policies, which promote investment
in the context of low inflation and effective macro-economic management,
increasing reliance on foreign direct investment and free trade. Taking into
account the simple fact that most developing countries, no matter to what
extent they are indeed committed to good domestic governance and promoting
economic freedom, simply do not have the capacity to address the contradictory
objectives of what I have referred to as pro-poor economic growth, I concluded
that ODA must be delivered in two phases. Over time, ODA should be replaced
with other sources of finance for development such as FDI, domestic savings
and export earnings. The objectives of ODA are to create the macroeconomic
conditions necessary to encourage economic growth, which in turn will increase
public participation in the development debate and hence country ownership,
and to reduce to minimum levels of absolute poverty, thus enlarging active
labor force to further foster economic growth. Adverse effects of the first
phase should be mitigated by an additional inflow of ODA targeting
specifically those affected by this process of restructuring. In order to
maximize the effectiveness of ODA, the principles of free trade must be
enforced and adhered to by all participants in the life of the global economy.
The wealth and prosperity generated by this process will in the end reduce
human insecurity world-wide.
Bibliography
Mekay, Emed, “2004 Foreign Aid Budget
Spotlights ‘War on Terror’”, Inter Press Service, February 3, 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/terrorism/2003/0203aid.htm (May
5, 2003)
“The Millennium Challenge Account,”
www.globalhealth.gov/mcafactsheet.shtml (May 5, 2003)
Endnotes
[i]
Article 2: International trade can play a major role in the promotion of
economic development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need
for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority
of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and
interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.
Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to
make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of
world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. In
this context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted,
sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes
have important roles to play.
Article 3: We recognize the particular vulnerability of the
least-developed countries and the special structural difficulties they
face in the global economy. We are committed to addressing the
marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to
improving their effective participation in the multilateral trading
system. We recall the commitments made by ministers at our meetings in
Marrakesh, Singapore and Geneva, and by the international community at the
Third UN Conference on Least-Developed Countries in Brussels, to help
least-developed countries secure beneficial and meaningful integration
into the multilateral trading system and the global economy. We are
determined that the WTO will play its part in building effectively on
these commitments under the Work Programme we are establishing.
Article 13: We recognize the work
already undertaken in the negotiations initiated in early 2000 under
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including the large number of
negotiating proposals submitted on behalf of a total of 121 members. We
recall the long-term objective referred to in the Agreement to establish a
fair and market-oriented trading system through a programme of fundamental
reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific commitments on support
and protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions and
distortions in world agricultural markets. We reconfirm our commitment to
this programme. Building on the work carried out to date and without
prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to
comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market
access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic
support. We agree that special and differential treatment for developing
countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations
and shall be embodied in the schedules of concessions and commitments and
as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be
operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively
take account of their development needs, including food security and rural
development. We take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the
negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that non-trade
concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in
the Agreement on Agriculture.
Article 14: Modalities for the
further commitments, including provisions for special and differential
treatment, shall be established no later than 31 March 2003. Participants
shall submit their comprehensive draft Schedules based on these modalities
no later than the date of the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference.
The negotiations, including with respect to rules and disciplines and
related legal texts, shall be concluded as part and at the date of
conclusion of the negotiating agenda as a whole.
Doha
WTO Ministerial: Ministerial Declaration (Adopted November 14, 2001),
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. Work Programme: Implementation-related Issues and
Concerns; Agriculture,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm)
(March 7, 2003)
[ii]
Article 5: We are aware that the challenges members face in a rapidly
changing international environment cannot be addressed through measures
taken in the trade field alone. We shall continue to work with the Bretton
Woods institutions for greater coherence in global economic policy-making.
Doha
WTO Ministerial: Ministerial Declaration (Adopted November 14, 2001),
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. Work Programme: Implementation-related Issues and
Concerns; Agriculture,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm)
(March 7, 2003)